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ABSTRACT
Health care has witnessed a rapid growth in the use of alternative
dispute resolution. Nationwide, many hospitals are adopting early dispute
resolution programs in which, when they err, they approach injured patients
with disclosure, apology, and restitution. The results have generally been
outstanding-better serving patients' and families' needs, and better for
institutions as they save large sums on defense costs while improving safety
and quality of care.
Unfortunately, physicians are largely left standing on the sidelines.
Medical malpractice payments, no matter how small, and no matter why they
were made, must generally be reported to the National Practitioner Data
Bank, where they remain as a black mark for the rest of the physician's
professional life. Weighing the high odds of winning if they defend in
litigation, versus a guaranteed black mark if they settle early, physicians are
not often interested in early mediation.
The literature is remarkably silent about this enormous disconnect. This
article attempts to fill that void, exploring why physicians commonly abjure
early mediation and recommending several specific, lawful ways for them to
avoid the data bank and thereby embrace early dispute resolution. In the
process, the article addresses the "moral hazard" issues attendant to
dodging the data bank, so that ultimately physicians should be able to take a
more active role in early mediation of medical malpractice disputes.
* Professor, Department of Internal Medicine, College of Medicine, University of
Tennessee Health Science Center. hmorreim@uthsc.edu. The author acknowledges, with
gratitude, the very helpful comments provided on earlier drafts by Les Rothenberg, J.D.,
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THE VIRTUES OF DODGING THE DATA BANK
OVERVIEW
There is little doubt that the current litigation system for addressing
medical injuries is fraught with problems. Although its goals include justice
and compensation for those wrongfully injured, and deterrence to prevent
similar errors in the future, evidence suggests these goals are not well met.
Although tort liability is sometimes the only way to achieve justice,
compensation and quality improvement have proven to be far more elusive
goals.
Compensation is poorly served because most negligently caused injuries
never result in a claim, while a large proportion of filed claims are not
connected with negligent injury, and the majority of damage awards overall
goes to pay for attorney fees and expenses. Similarly, litigation's deterrence
function poorly serves quality improvement. Most adverse events are the
result, not so much of an individual provider's error, as of complex system
flaws that can only be explored and rectified with information from
everyone-physicians, nurses, administrators, patients, and families.
Unfortunately, litigation tends to inhibit this much-needed communication.
In recent years, however, some hospitals have discovered the benefits of
broad communication and early resolution. When these hospitals' internal
investigations reveal they have erred, disclosure, apology, and mediation can
compensate patients and families better, preserve important relationships,
save the hospital substantial sums on defense costs, shorten times to
resolution, reduce the number of outstanding lawsuits, and pennit the
detailed exploration that can improve quality on the systems-level. Part I of
this article will discuss the history, advantages, and recent developments in
early dispute resolution.
In theory, early dispute resolution should be equally attractive to
physicians. As discussed in Part II, however, the National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB) poses a major barrier. Created as part of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), the NPDB maintains a
permanent record of adverse professional events for physicians, including
payments made to resolve medical malpractice claims. These NPDB reports
are permanent. Although the details are kept confidential from the public,
hospitals must query the Data Bank when initially credentialing, and every
two years thereafter, for each physician on their medical staff.
The NPDB thus forces an unhappy choice on physicians considering
early resolution. If they fight the matter all the way through trial, physicians
have very strong odds of winning. But if they settle early the consequence
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may be a permanent "black mark" in the Data Bank, even if early settlement
is otherwise better for everyone.
On closer inspection, however, perhaps the NPDB need not loom so
large. Certain exceptions to the reporting requirement are already well
known, and will be detailed in Part II. They include paying out of pocket,
oral rather than written claims, "corporate shield," and other approaches.
Part III discusses another potential exemption from NPDB reporting. In
recent years, many states have enacted pre-suit notification statutes requiring
that a prospective plaintiff notify potential defendants prior to filing a
medical malpractice claim-typically 60 or 90 days in advance. Although
some malpractice insurers believe that they must report any settlement
payouts made during this pre-suit notification period, this article argues to
the contrary. Applicable case law and plain language suggest that a potential
claim is not yet an actual claim, and that a preview of a future claim is not,
itself, a present claim. Insurers thus should not report settlement payouts
made during this statutory window of opportunity for early resolution.
Finally, Part IV will address the "moral hazard" issues that arise if we
endorse minimizing NPDB reports. If the purpose of NPDB reports is to
warn hospitals and state medical boards that a particular physician may be
incompetent or otherwise problematic, it might seem inappropriate to
recommend avoiding NPDB malpractice payment reports at every lawful
opportunity. However, as Part IV will show, the NPDB is hardly a faithful
documentation of poor-quality medical practice. For one thing, there is wide
variation in the character of the events being reported. Many malpractice
settlements are the product of a simple business decision that it is cheaper to
settle than fight, while in other cases, physicians such as military doctors are
only reported if extensive review reveals genuine malpractice. Additionally,
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) acknowledges
substantial underreporting, essentially conceding that the mandate to report is
simply unenforceable. Ultimately, a significant portion of the data are of such
mixed and dubious quality that, as the expression goes, "garbage in, garbage
out."
Part IV also argues that the HCQIA's focus on hospitals' peer review
committees as the major locus for monitoring physician performance has
become archaic. Fewer and fewer physicians actually practice in hospitals,
hence if the NPDB's goal is to prevent incompetent physicians from moving
state-to-state, hospital surveillance is no longer a reliable mechanism.
Additionally, although hospital peer review remains an important function
for other reasons, it should focus on physicians' actual medical practices, not
on an odd collection of largely uninterpretable data.
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Fortunately, newer forms of continuing quality review are arising from
emerging payment systems such as "value-based purchasing" and from new
forms of health care delivery such as Accountable Care Organizations. As
payers look more for quality of outcomes than quantity of inputs, the new
provider organizations are creating solid financial incentives to provide
comprehensive, high-quality care. This will require far more careful
monitoring of physicians' performance than a biennial inspection of dubious
entries in a Data Bank.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to the extent that the NPDB
deters physicians from entering into early dispute resolution, the result can be
far more harmful to quality improvement-the central focus of the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act-than any putative benefits from mandating
malpractice payment reports. In the end, dodging the Data Bank is not
merely permissible, it is, on the whole, desirable.
I. EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EVOLUTION AND ADVANTAGES
For a patient suffering an adverse event from medical care, the legal
system's standard remedy is tort litigation, whose goals are justice,
compensation for those injured by others' negligence, quality improvement
via deterrence, and sometimes punishment.'
A. Litigation's Failures to Meet its Goals
Unfortunately, litigation often fails to satisfy these goals in medical
malpractice cases. Although sometimes a lawsuit is the only way to achieve
justice, litigation generally does poorly in compensating losses or improving
quality of care. Compensation is poorly served partly because the substantial
majority of negligent iatrogeniC 2 injuries do not lead to a filed claim
(especially injuries that are financially too small to warrant attorneys'
interest), and reciprocally the majority of filed claims are not associated with
I Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of
Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality Improvement, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP.PROBS. 185, 185 (1997).
2 "latrogenesis" and "iatrogenic injury" refer to adverse outcomes caused by
physicians or surgeons, or by the health care process. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, 646-47 (26th ed., 1981). The term should not be confused with negligence.
An infection, for instance, may be an iatrogenic injury caused by chemotherapy for
cancer. It is usually, however, a known and accepted result of the immunologic effects of
the chemotherapy-not negligent, but physician-caused nonetheless.
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negligent iatrogenesis. 3 Even among filed cases, the odds quite strongly favor
defendants. The majority of filed cases are dropped, and, of those that
actually make it to trial, defendants prevail the great majority of the time.4
Even where the plaintiff prevails, the majority of the award on average goes
to cover attorneys' fees and expenses. 5
In like manner, litigation does poorly as a vehicle for improving
quality-which purportedly is to occur via deterring similar negligent
3 Dauer & Marcus, supra note 1, at 190 n.4 ("Andrews et al. reported serious
injuries at a rate of 17.7%, with claims for compensation at only 1.2%. See Lori B.
Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care,
349 LANCET 309, 312 (1997). The Harvard study found that one out of seven patients
injured through actionable negligence made claims (assuming that all claims made came
from the pool of negligent events), and that one out of five cases where negligence
caused death or at least six months of disability resulted in a paid claim." Dauer &
Marcus, supra note 1, at 185, 190; Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent
Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 1963, 1963-67 (1996). See also William M. Sage et al., Bridging the Relational-
Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic Information Policy for Patient Safety and Medical
Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1263, 1271 (2006); Florence Yee, Mandatory Mediation:
The Extra Dose Needed to Cure the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 393, 425 (2006).
4 David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2024, 2026 (2006) (finding that, of the
15% of claims that were decided by trial verdict, plaintiffs prevailed only 21% of the
time).
More recently, a study by the American Medical Association found, on the basis of
data from the Physician Insurers Association of America, that in 2008, 65% of claims
were dropped, dismissed, or withdrawn; 25.7% were settled, and only 5% were resolved
by trial. Of those that went to trial, physician defendants prevailed 90% of the time. Carol
K. Kane, MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIM FREQUENCY: A 2007-2008 SNAPSHOT OF
PHYSICIANS, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/363/prp-
201001 -claim-freq.pdf.
In Tennessee in 2008 the figures were even more dramatic. Of 3,154 claims closed
in the state in 2008, only 425 were resolved through judgment at trial. Of those, the
defendant prevailed in 420, with plaintiff taking nothing. TENN. DEP'T OF COM. & INS.,
2009 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS REPORT 4, 6 (Nov. 1, 2009),
http://www.tn.gov/commerce/insurance/documents/2009MedicalMalpracticeClaimsRepo
rt.pdf.
5 See, e.g., Studdert et al., supra note 4, at 2028-29. One recent study found that "for
every dollar spent on compensation, 54 cents went to administrative expenses (including
those involving lawyers, experts, and courts)." The study also found that 37% of the
claims examined did not involve errors; claims not involving errors accounted for
between 13% and 16% of the system's total monetary costs. Id.
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performance in the future by this and other providers. Deterrence as quality
improvement, however, is problematic in several ways.
First, litigation tends to inspire costly and sometimes harmful defensive
medicine, loosely defined as "tests and procedures ordered by physicians
principally to reduce perceived threats of medical malpractice liability." 6
Studies have shown that the extra tests and treatments physicians order in the
effort to ward off perceived risks of litigation can increase healthcare costs
by billions annually and can, themselves, cause a cascade of further testing
and iatrogenic injury.7
Second, litigation can impair providers' quality of performance.
Evidence suggests that physicians named in a lawsuit tend to suffer a marked
increase in symptoms of depression, including fatigue, insomnia, difficulty in
concentrating, decreased self-confidence, or a loss of nerve in clinical
activities.8 Physicians named in a suit also have an increased chance of being
named in another suit within the first two years. 9 More recent data show that
surgeons who had committed a major error experienced a three-fold increase
6 J. William Thomas et al., Low Costs Of Defensive Medicine, Small Savings From
Tort Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1578, 1578 (2010).
7 See Richard E. Anderson, Billions for Defense: The Pervasive Nature of Defensive
Medicine, 159 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED., 2399, 2399; Randall R. Bovbjerg et al.,
Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: New Evidence in an Old Bottle, 21 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L., 267-88 (1996); Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians' Fears of Malpractice
Lawsuits Are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFF., 1585, (2010); Dauer &
Marcus, supra note 1, at 191-92; Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical
Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1572-74 (2010); David M. Studdert et al.,
Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice
Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609-17 (2005).
8 Edward A. Dauer, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Legal Responses to
Medical Error, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 37, 43 (2003). "Sara Charles, a psychiatrist at the
University of Illinois, 'found distinct elevations in what she termed "depressive symptom
clusters"-increased incidences of, for example, fatigue, insomnia, difficulty in
concentrating, headache and other physical illnesses, suicidal ideation, and a sharp
(nearly tripled) increase in excessive alcohol use. Other subjective reports showed lower
self-esteem, decreased self-confidence, "loss of nerve" in clinical situations, increased
sense of being misunderstood and of being defeated; and marked increases in reports of
anger, inner tension, depressed mood, frustration, and irritability."' Id.
9 See id at 45. Theodore Passineau, Manager of Physician Risk Management at the
Farmer's Insurance Group observed that "[p]hysicians against whom claims had been
made had, in the first quarter following that first claim, a nearly 15% risk of experiencing
a loss; an odds ratio (OR) of nearly 3:1 over the average for all practitioners in the group.
The elevated risk extinguished over time, the OR slowly declining to about 1:1 after two
years." Id. See also Yee, supra note 3, at 423-24.
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in suicidal ideation during the three months following the error, "with 16.2%
of surgeons who reported a recent major error experiencing [suicidal
ideation] compared with 5.4% of surgeons not reporting an error."10
Third, and most important for present purposes, litigation's deterrence
approach to quality improvement tends to inhibit communication at a time
when robust communication is most urgently needed.'I By the early 1990s,
health policy scholars had solidly established that errors in health care were
most often due, not to the single actions of an errant individual, but to
complex concatenations of system-level factors. As Lucian Leape pointed
out in 1994, health system errors caused some 180,000 deaths per year, or
"the equivalent of three jumbo-jet crashes every [two] days."' 2 He and others
imported concepts of "Total Quality Management" and "Continuous Quality
Improvement" 13 into health care, emphasizing that systems-level
improvement requires "(1) a culture in which errors and deviations are
regarded not as individuals' failures but as opportunities to improve the
system, (2) a 'grassroots' participation in identifying errors and their sources,
and the ways to system modification, and (3) a commitment to TQM from
organizational leadership."' 4 Numerous scholars have explored the complex
10 Taid D. Shanafelt et al., Suicidal Ideation Among American Surgeons, 146
ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 54, 57 (2011).
11 Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stern Hyman, MEDICAL ERROR DISCLOSURE,
MEDIATION SKILLS, AND MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT IN
PENNSYLVANIA, 2-3 (2005), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Medical liability/Lie
bmanReport.pdf. See also id. at 10 ("[c]onfrontational litigation is antithetical to
meaningful communication after an error or adverse event. Instead of mistrust and anger,
patients and survivors need to feel understood and respected.. . . . Timely communication
helps physicians and hospitals receive valuable information relevant to patient safety.").
12 Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994).
13 "Continuous Quality Improvement" is a term initially introduced to describe
quality improvement in industry, by writers such as W. Edwards Deming, OUT OF THE
CRISIS (1986), Joseph Juran, QUALITY CONTROL HANDBOOK (1951), and Philip Crosby,
QUALITY IS FREE (1979). It was subsequently expanded to health care. See, e.g., Curtis P.
McLaughlin & Arnold D. Kaluzny, CONTINUOUs QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTH
CARE: THEORY, IMPLEMENTATIONS, AND APPLICATIONS (3d ed. 2006) (discussing both
Total Quality Management/TQM and Continuous Quality Improvement/CQI in health
care).
14 Dauer & Marcus, supra note 1, at 198 (citing Laura Morlock & Faye Malitz, Do
Hospital Risk Management Programs Make a Difference? Relationships Between Risk
Management Program Activities and Hospital Malpractice Claims Experience, 54 LAW
& COMTEMP. PROBS. 1, 21 (1991)).
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roles that systems play in creating latent failures and other factors that, in
turn, conduce to adverse events.15
Thus, if we wish to improve health care following an adverse event, we
must first understand what the problem was. To understand what the problem
was we must understand, in detail, what actually happened. And to
understand what actually happened, we must retreat from the historically
common "name, blame, and shame" response to a more productive approach
that favors thorough, ongoing communication and problem-solving. 16 The
adversarial tort system, focused as it is on pinpointing blame, systematically
inhibits essential communication and thereby impairs system-level quality
improvement.1 7 As observed by Dauer and Marcus:
Individuals do make errors and should be responsible for the quality of their
work. Nevertheless, the "bad apple" approach of the tort system focuses on
outliers rather than on more pervasive influences. It looks at outliers as if
they were significant when in fact they are most often highly unusual and
sometimes random events. The strategy of quality improvement system
design, by contrast, is to recognize that errors occur, to recognize that
people work within systems, and to design the systems to do two things: (1)
15 See COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 29-32, 58-66 (Linda
T. Kohn et al., eds., 2000); see also David Blumenthal, Total Quality Management and
Physicians' Clinical Decisions, 269 JAMA 2775, 2775-78; David Blumenthal & Charles
M. Kilo, A Report Card on Continuous Quality Improvement, 76 THE MILBANK
QUARTERLY 625, 625-48 (1998); Thomas Bodenheimer, The American Health Care
System: The Movement for Improved Quality in Health Care, 340 NEw ENGL. J. MED.
488, 488-90 (1999); Mark R. Chassin, Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality?, 76
THE MILBANK QUARTERLY, 565, 565-78 (1998); Avedis Donabedian, The Quality of
Care: How Can it Be Assessed?, 260 JAMA 1743, 1743-48 (1988); David M. Eddy,
Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 343, 343-
47 (1982); Stephen F. Jencks & Gail R. Wilensky, The Health Care Quality Improvement
Initiative, 268 JAMA 900, 900-03 (1992); Glenn Laffel & Donald Berwick, Quality in
Health Care, 268 JAMA 407, 407-08 (1992); Glenn Laffel & David Blumenthal, The
Case for Using Industrial Quality Management Science in Health Care Organizations,
262 JAMA 2869, 2869-70 (1989).
16 REPORT OF THE QUALITY INTERAGENCY COORDINATION TASK FORCE (QUIC) TO
THE PRESIDENT, February 2000, DOING WHAT COUNTS FOR PATIENT SAFETY: FEDERAL
ACTIONS To REDUCE MEDICAL ERRORS AND THEIR IMPACT (2000), available at
http://www.quic.gov/report/toc.htm. See also Timothy McDonald et al., Responding to
Patient Safety Incidents: the "Seven Pillars," 19 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE
ell, ell (2010) 19th ed., available at
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/19/6/1.31.full.pdf
17 Dauer & Marcus, supra note 1, at 198-99, 204.
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to make it difficult for individuals to make errors and (2) to make the whole
system capable of "absorbing" individuals' errors when they occur by
identifying and correcting errors before they can be harmful. Even when a
doctor has committed an error of judgment or skill, a systems approach
demands to know how and why that infraction came about.18
The point is illustrated well by the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of a
serious medication error in which a nurse caring for a sixteen-year-old
obstetric patient mistakenly infused epidural anesthesia medications into the
intravenous port intended for antibiotics. 19 The patient suffered virtually
immediate cardiovascular collapse and died.20 A litigation-based approach to
quality improvement following such an event would emphasize deterrence:
Blame and shame the nurse for such obvious carelessness and thereby deter
her and onlookers from future such negligence.
As a careful RCA of the events revealed, however, the realities were far
more complex. 21 Among other factors, the infusion bags for the two kinds of
medication were nearly identical, and the ports were fully interconnectable-
even though epidural medications should only be administered intrathecally
(into the spinal canal), never intravenously, and the antibiotics should be
administered intravenously. 22 Moreover, the nurse had worked two straight
shifts the day before, with barely eight hours off in between those two and
the present shift because she had agreed to cover for a colleague. 23 This
nursing unit had a policy of using only its own nurses rather than drawing
nursing help from elsewhere in the hospital, hence any shortage of manpower
could only be addressed by another nurse within the unit.24 Numerous other
system-level problems also were identified, such as the glitches in bringing
18 Id. at 195. For a detailed discussion of the differences between tort versus
systems-improvement approaches to medical error, see id. at 196-98.
19 Judy Smetzer et al., Shaping Systems for Better Behavioral Choices: Lessons
Learned from a Fatal Medication Error, 36 J. COMM'N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT
SAFETY 152, 152-63 (2010).
20 Id.
21 Id. See also Sidney W.A. Dekker, We have Newton on a Retainer: Reductionism
When We Need Systems Thinking, 36 J. CoMM'N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 147,
147-49 (2010); Charles R. Denham, The Missing Safe Practice, 36 J. COMM'N J. ON
QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 149, 149-50 (2010); Lucian L. Leape, Who's to Blame?, 36
J. COMM'N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 150, 150-51 (2010).
22 Smetzer, et al. supra note 19, at 156-57.
23 Id.
24 Denham, supra note 21, at 149.
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the hospital's new bar code ID and medication-reader system online.25 In the
end, a highly skilled nurse with thirteen years' exemplary performance was
criminally indicted and her license was suspended for nine months. 26
If there is a lesson here, it is that quality is not optimally improved by
simply demanding that inherently fallible human beings be ever more
obsessively attentive. 27 People become fatigued, distracted, or inattentive,
and safety systems must plan for this. Here, an exhausted nurse was caring
for a terrified sixteen-year-old, and also for a young woman who knew that
her labor would produce only a stillborn infant. 28 Rather than satisfying
ourselves with indictments and license revocation, we need to recognize that
quality improvement is often better served, not by punitive responses, but by
constructing system-level safeguards to reduce the chances of error.29
To the extent that tort litigation's approach to quality improvement
emphasizes individual culprits, presumes that errors are mainly the product
of individual persons' failings, and recommends making those individuals
pay a personal price so that they will be more attentive next time, it is out of
touch with contemporary realities of quality and safety improvement in
complex systems such as health care. Rather, free-flowing communication
and problem-solving are required. 30
Unfortunately, litigation tends severely to inhibit such communication.
Insurers have historically urged physicians not to discuss the case with the
patient/family once an adverse event has occurred, lest they say something
that could, as an admission by a party opponent,31 work against them later.32
25 Dekker, supra note 21, at 147-148; Smetzer et al., supra note 19, at 153-59.
26 The nurse's license was suspended for nine months per a consent agreement. See
In the Matter Of Disciplinary Proceedings against Julie Thao, R.N., Dec. 14, 2006,
Wisconsin Department of Regulation & Licensing, No. LSO612145NUR,
https://online.drl.wi.gov/decisions/2006/1s0612145nur-00075545.pdf.
27 Recent evidence from the nursing home industry confirms the same finding for
long-term care. See David M. Studdert et al., Relationship Between Quality of Care and
Negligence Litigation in Nursing Homes, 364 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1243, 1243-50 (2011)
(finding there is very little difference in the rate of negligence litigation between
institutions exhibiting high quality of care and those exhibiting considerably lower
quality of care).
28 Smetzer et al., supra note 19, at 157.
29 This is not to say, of course, that punitive responses to error are never appropriate.
Particularly where an error is the product of an individual's conscious indifference to
safety and quality concerns, punitive approaches can be the best option.
30 Liebman, supra note 11, at 39-40.
31 See FED. R. EvID. 801(2)(c).
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Co-defendants who initially collaborate may quickly fall into mutual finger-
pointing, further shutting down communication. Physicians may also be
counseled against speaking with uninvolved physicians-at a time when they
may most need to reflect with colleagues about what happened-lest those
colleagues be subpoenaed to testify.33 Attorneys in discovery commonly play
a drawn-out game of "hide the ball," revealing as little as possible as slowly
as possible, perhaps to make the case as difficult and expensive as possible
for the opposing party. 34 Thus, "formal discovery is a cumbersome and
disjointed process involving sporadic provision of information, which
plaintiffs must then piece together to construct the overall timeline and flow
of factual information." 35 And in the end, patients or families whose main
reason for filing suit may have been because no one would tell them what
happened 36 may never receive answers to those questions.37
32 See John D. Banja, Does Medical Error Disclosure Violate the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Cooperation Clause?, 3 ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: FROM
RESEARCH TO IMPLEMENTATION 371 (Kerm Henriksen et al., eds., 2005) (arguing that,
despite a contractual clause requiring physicians to cooperate with their insurers in the
event of potential litigation, medical malpractice insurers have never successfully
penalized a physician for honest communication with injured patients; noting also that
failure to communicate honestly may raise, rather than reduce, the likelihood of
litigation).
33 Andrew Feld & Richard Moses, Most Doctors Win: What to Do if Sued for
Medical Malpractice, 104 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1346, 1348 (2009). See also
Liebman, supra note 11, at 41-42.
34 William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH AFF. 10, 10-11 (2004) ("Information about the cause of
injuries is denied patients and families for prolonged periods, compensation is
unavailable when it is most needed, and quality feedback to providers is attenuated to the
point of uselessness.").
35 Dale C. Hetzler, Superordinate Claims Management: Resolution Focus from Day
One, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 892 (2005).
36 See, e.g., Howard B. Beckman et al., The Doctor-Patient Relationship and
Malpractice: Lessons from Plaintiff Disposition, 154 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1365,
1368 (1994) (finding doctor-patient relationship issues as key factors behind patient
complaints). See also Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File
Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361
(1992); Wendy Levinson, Physician-Patient Communication: A Key to Malpractice
Prevention, 272 JAMA 1619, 1619 (1994) ("Malpractice attorneys asked to cite the
primary reason the patient pursued a malpractice suit report that more than 80% are due
to communication issues. . . . 35% were due to physician attitudes (in a hurry, air of
superiority. . .7% were due to physician disparagement of previous care, and 5% were
due to unrealistic patient expectation."); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue
Doctors? A Study ofPatients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1611
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B. Advantages and Successes in Early Dispute Resolution
Early dispute resolution, including interest-based mediation, stands in
sharp contrast to litigation as a means of addressing adverse outcomes. It
begins with the recognition that financial compensation is not the only
important goal. Injured patients and families commonly have many other
objectives. 38
Simply finding out what happened is often a preeminent goal,
particularly where providers appear to have "circled the wagons," offering
only silence or evasiveness. 39 Patients and families also often insist that "this
must not happen to anyone else," expressing a strong interest in improving
quality and safety. 40 Despite the adverse outcome, they may also want to
preserve a provider-patient relationship on which they may have relied for
many years.4 1 These and other goals are not well served by a litigation in
which each party retreats to a fortified bunker, communicating with the other
only via highly-paid messengers.
The stark contrast between the limited goals served by litigation, and the
broader goals parties actually seek, has recently become a key focus for a
growing number of hospitals. As early as the 1980s, a Veterans
Administration hospital in Lexington, Kentucky announced its success with a
program dubbed "extreme honesty." 42 Instead of the customary approach in
which a hospital, even when aware it had erred, would remain silent and
hope the patient never found out, this hospital opted instead to embrace
(1994).
37 Litigation typically requires around five years to resolve. Sage, supra note 34, at
11; see also Yee, supra note 3, at 407.
38 Carol Liebman & Chris Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure
ofErrors and Adverse Events to Patients, 23 HEALTH AFF. 22, 24 (2004).
3 9 See generally SANDRA M. GILBERT, WRONGFUL DEATH: A MEMOIR (1995); Tom
Delbanco & Sigall K. Bell, Guilty, Afraid, and Alone-Struggling with Medical Error,
357 NEW ENGL. J. MED 1682, 1682-83 (2007); Anna C. Mastroianni, Michelle M. Mello,
Shannon Sommer, Mary Hardy & Thomas H. Gallagher, The Flaws in State 'Apology'
and 'Disclosure' Laws Dilute Their Intended Impact on Malpractice Suits, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1611, 1612 (2010).
40 See Dale C. Hetzler, Superordinate Claims Management: Resolution Focus from
Day One, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 891, 894 (2005).
41 Id. ("In addition, many potential plaintiffs are still patients or wish to remain
patients, so they want to maintain that relationship.").
42 Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May be
the Best Policy, 131 ANNALs OF INTERNAL MED. 963, 966-67 (1999).
121
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
affirmative disclosure. 43 The hospital's protocol called for informing the
patient/family that it had made an error, convening meetings with the
patient/family (encouraging them to be represented by counsel), explaining
what happened and what further investigations and safety improvements
were underway as a result of the event, and offering compensation. 44 Nearly
a decade after the project began, total malpractice payments placed the
hospital in the bottom quartile of its peer group.45
Other hospitals have advanced the concept. Beginning in the late 1990s
the University of Michigan Health System (UMHS) began an active
disclosure-with-offer program. By 2001, UMHS "began responding to all
open and new malpractice claims by admitting fault and offering
compensation when an internal investigation reveals medical error. If an
investigation reveals no error, UMHS provides the reasons for its conclusion
and vigorously defends a claim, if necessary. In April 2002, UMHS began
linking the investigation process with peer review and quality improvement
efforts:" 46
By February 2003, the disclosure program was fully integrated with patient
safety efforts. The program now identifies patient injuries through various
means, including reporting by employees, patients or family members, or
patients' attorneys. It uses experienced risk managers with clinical
backgrounds to lead investigations and mediate patient concerns as facts are
collected, care quality is evaluated, and conclusions are disclosed. The
UMHS emphasizes honesty and transparency with patients and staff,
regardless of whether events resulted from error, and encourages staff to
enlist risk management in the disclosure process,47
Every patient and his lawyer is invited to confer about the problems that
arose during the patient's care, where "[o]pen, honest, and robust discussions
occur ... . Expert opinions are exchanged and agreements are reached-
agreements to drop the claim, agreements to settle (sometimes with an
43 Id. at 963.
44 Id. at 966-67 (1999); see also Albert W. Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is
Disclosure the Best Defense?, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 972, 972-73 (1999).
45 Kraman, supra note 42. See also Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs
Before and After Implementation of a Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 213, 219 (2010).
46 Kachalia, supra note 45, at 213-14. See also Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better
Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J.
HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 125, 137-46 (2009).
47 Kachalia, supra note 45, at 213-14.
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apology), and occasionally, agreements to disagree. Patients develop a
thorough understanding of what happened before misconceptions and bogus
information drive them to the courthouse." 48
Once the program had been fully operational for several years, the results
were striking:
[The] average monthly rate of new claims decreased from 7.03 to 4.52 per
100,000 patient encounters ... The average monthly rate of lawsuits
decreased from 2.13 to 0.75 per 100,000 patient encounters ... Median time
from claim reporting to resolution decreased from 1.36 to 0.95 years.
Average monthly cost rates decreased for total liability . . . patient
compensation ... and non-compensation-related legal costs....49
The cost per lawsuit decreased from $405,921 to $228,308.50 Equally
important, these savings have been redirected into quality improvement
projects.51
Other medical centers have reported similar experiences. In the late
1990s, Children's Healthcare of Atlanta (Children's) began applying an
interest-based approach to claims resolution, in the recognition that
"[p]laintiffs with health care disputes generally want three things: (1) to
know why or how the incident happened, (2) to learn what the provider has
done to prevent a recurrence, and (3) to receive sincere apology." 52 Injured
patients and families were encouraged to retain legal representation. Rather
than the evasive communication familiar in litigation, the role of the
litigation manager was to provide and explain non-privileged information as
fully and quickly as possible, to answer questions and explore patients' and
families' concerns, and to try to use the lessons learned to improve the
institution's quality of care.53
The savings that accrued for Children's were significant, even as the
process lent far greater respect to patients' and families' goals. Total time to
resolution went from 36 down to 18 months, while defense costs were
reduced about $52,000 per case. 54 These tended to mirror the 50-80%
savings realized by non-healthcare organizations that likewise shifted from
48 Boothman, supra note 46, at 142.
49 Kachalia, supra note 45, at 213.
50 Id. at 217.
51 Boothman, supra note 46, at 145.
52 Hetzler, supra note 40, at 894 (citing Liebman, supra note 38, at 22).
53 Id. at 894-95.
54 Id. at 896.
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traditional litigation-based conflict management to an early resolution
approach.55
A number of other health care institutions have likewise moved away
from litigation and toward early resolution, with a focus on enhancing
information exchange and addressing the concerns that are most important to
each party in the process. 56 Overall quality improvement is deemed an
important result for providers and patients alike. 57 Not all institutions are
fully aware yet of the potential for safety improvements alongside financial
savings, but the spectrum of benefits is becoming increasingly evident.58
55 Karl A. Slaikeu & Diane W. Slaikeu, Confidential from General Counsel to CEO:
"I'm Fed Up, and We're Not Going to Take This Anymore!", 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 335, 342 (2002) (describing early dispute resolution in a variety of industries).
56 These institutions are said to include Kaiser Permanente, Children's Hospital and
Clinics of MN, Johns Hopkins, Catholic Healthcare West, Chicago Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Medical Center, Drexel University College of Medicine, Minnesota Fairview
Hospitals, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, University of Illinois at Chicago. See
Boothman, supra note 46, at 146-47; Chris S. Hyman et al., Interest-Based Mediation of
Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: A Route to Improved Patient Safety?, 35 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 797 (2010); Stephen Langel, Averting Medical Malpractice Lawsuits:
Effective Medicine-or Inadequate Cure?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1565 (2010); Yee, supra note
3, at 438-42; Max D. Brown, Rush Hospital's Medical Malpractice Mediation Program:
An ADR Success Story, 86 ILL. B.J. 432, 432 (1998); Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and
Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1447 (2000). See also Richard Blatt, Max Brown, & Jerome Lerner, Co-Mediation: A
Success Story at Chicago's Rush Medical Center, available at
http://www.adrsystems.com/news/Co-Mediation.pdf; Liebman, supra note 11, at 53-56;
Christopher Guadagnino, Malpractice Mediation Poised to Expand, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS
DIGEST (April 2004), http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/404.html; Robert A. Creo,
Jacqueline 0. Shogan, & Chat6n T. Turner, Malpractice Case Alternative Dispute
Resolution, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST, available at
http://www.physiciansnews.com/2005/11/13/malpractice-case-alternative-dispute-
resolution.
57 McDonald et al., supra note 16, at 3 (describing University of Illinois Medical
Center at Chicago program in which an amplified safety reporting system resulted in
more than 2000 annual incident reports, more than 100 disclosure conversations and
twenty "full disclosures" of inappropriate or unreasonable care, which in turn translated
into approximately 200 system improvements).
58 Hyman, supra note 56, at 798, 813-815 (observing that defense attorneys
sometimes are reluctant to mediate):
Although defense lawyers' reluctance to mediate may have resulted from
misaligned interests of defendants and their lawyers (Wissler 2004), it seems
likely that hospital and insurer clients failed to give their outside counsel
instructions that would have led them to make better use of the mediation
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The advantages of this approach are not just financial. Early mediation is
considerably more flexible than litigation, permitting parties to structure
whatever outcome makes best for all under the circumstances. 59 Appropriate
experts can be brought in to ensure that compensation accounts for future
contingencies as well as known realities. 60 As noted by Boothman et al.:
By interrupting the march to the courthouse, the animosity intrinsic to suing
someone is lessened and often avoided, which allows for discussions not
impassioned by name-calling, threats of professional ruin, reinforced
victimhood, exaggerated claims, and dismissive defenses. If it appears that
compensation is owed, the discussion shifts from the typical approach, in
which both sides take equally unreasonable financial positions and work
towards a middle ground, evidence-based discussions about what is truly
owed because of the medical error. With this approach, it is not uncommon
for a settlement amount to be very close to the original offer and for both
sides to agree on the substantive basis for the settlement. 6 1
In theory, this sort of early dispute resolution should be at least as
attractive to physicians as to hospitals.62 Hospitals also have a keen interest
in improving quality to reduce future errors. And they, like many patients,
may want to repair the relationship damage that an adverse outcome can
cause, and to reach some sense of fairness and equilibrium for all in the
process. Unfortunately, a significant roadblock stands in the way.
process (Shapiro 2008: 4). Medical malpractice defendants, who focus primarily
on how to put off and ultimately limit payment to plaintiffs, tend to ignore the
opportunity to learn from errors and repair damaged relationships and
reputations, and therefore bear responsibility for the nonconciliatory attitudes
shown by their lawyers.
Id. at 815 (citation omitted).
59 Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of
Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality Improvement, 60 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 199, 204 (1997); See also Yee, supra note 3, at 416-26.
60 Boothman, supra note 47, at 156.
61 Boothman, supra note 47, at 142.
62 Some states actually require mediation soon after a suit is filed. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 766.108 (WEST 2007) ("Mandatory mediation and mandatory settlement
conference in medical negligence actions," requiring mediation within 120 days after a
suit is filed). See also W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(f), (g) (permitting defendant provider to
require parties to mediate); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-120 (mandating pre-suit mediation).
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II. NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK
For physicians, early mediation of the sort described above is relatively
uncommon. For instance, of 3,154 medical malpractice claims closed in
Tennessee in 2008, only 43, or 1.36%, were resolved through alternative
dispute resolution, either mediation or arbitration. 63 One major reason is the
fact that payments made to settle or pay a judgment for a medical malpractice
claim will usually result in a permanent "black mark" in a record known as
the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). 64 Settling a malpractice claim
thus carries a major disadvantage.
In contrast, physicians usually win if a case actually goes to trial.65 That
same year in Tennessee, only 425 of the 3,154 claims were resolved through
judgment. Of those, the defendant prevailed in 420, with plaintiff taking
nothing.66 The math makes the decision appear obvious: Why settle early and
incur a life-long black mark, when a physician can hold on for a highly likely
victory later on. 67
63 2009 TENN. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & INS., MED. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS REP., supra
note 4. In 2009 that figure rose to 9.87%, although it should be noted that this figure
applies to other types of health care professionals in addition to physicians, such as
dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, and nurses. See 2010 TENN. DEP'T OF COMMERCE &
INS., MED. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS REP., 4, 15, available at
http://www.state.tn.us/commerce/insurance/documents/201 OMedicalMalpracticeClaimsR
eport.pdf.
64 John J. Fraser, Jr., & Committee on Medical Liability, Technical Report:
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 107 PEDIATRICS 602, 605 (2001);
see also Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of the National Practitioner Data Bank on
Resolution of Malpractice Claims, 40 INQUIRY 283, 290 (2003); Lawrence E. Smarr, A
Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National Practitioner
Data Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 59, 71 (1997);
Michelle M. Mello & Thomas H. Gallagher, Malpractice Reform-Opportunities for
Leadership by Health Care Institutions and Liability Insurers, 362 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
1353, 1355 (2010).
65 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
66 2009 TENN. DEP'T OF COM. & INS., MED. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS REP., supra note
4, at 6. The following year, of 177 claims resolved through judgment, defendants
prevailed in 165 with no damages awarded to the plaintiff. 2010 TENN. DEP'T OF COM. &
INS., MED. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS REP., supra note 63, at 7.
67 Dwight Golann, Dropped Medical Malpractice Claims: Their Surprising
Frequency, Apparent Causes and Potential Remedies, 30(7) HEALTH AFF. 1343, 1343,
1345 (2011); Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty,
365 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 629, 632-39 (2011).
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A. NPDB Origins and Physician Concerns
The NPDB was created as part of the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act (HCQIA) of 1986.68 The Act arose largely in response to a perceived
need to reduce the incidence of malpractice, 69 and it sought to "restrict the
ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to State without
disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent
performance." 70 Toward that end, the Act's primary strategy was to ramp up
hospital-based peer review, first by providing qualified immunity for those
who participate in such review,71 second by providing broader information
on which to base such review. 72
Qualified immunity was deemed necessary because many physicians
feared serious antitrust litigation if their actions against a colleague were
perceived more as anticompetitive than as quality improvement.73 A broader
information base was created by establishing the NPDB to serve as a
repository for information about adverse licensure actions taken by state
boards of medical examiners, 74 adverse professional review actions
68 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2006).
69 The Act was expressly not directed at the malpractice insurance crisis, but rather
was directed at malpractice itself. See H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (1986) reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384.
70 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (2006).
71 Per 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a), the "professional review action must be taken-(1) in
the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care, (2) after
a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) after adequate notice and hearing
procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are
fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable belief that the
action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and
after meeting" specified procedural requirements.
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-33 (2006)
73 Patrick v. Burget was a case garnering particular attention at the time. Timothy
Patrick, an Astoria, Oregon surgeon, developed difficult relationships with colleagues in
the community, eventually leading to termination of Patrick's hospital privileges.
Although a jury found in favor of Dr. Patrick on his antitrust claim, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding that the physician's peer review activities fell within the state's statute
exempting peer review from antitrust scrutiny. The HCQIA was enacted that same year.
Two years later the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that these
particular peer review activities were not exempted from antitrust statutes. Patrick v.
Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1509 (9f Cir. 1986), rev'd486 U.S. 94, 105-06 (1988).
74 See 42 U.S.C. § 11132 (2006).
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undertaken by health care entities such as hospitals 75 and, of particular
importance here, medical malpractice payments made on physicians'
behalf.76 The trigger for a medical malpractice report is found in § 11131(a),
which provides:
Each entity (including an insurance company) which makes payment under
a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial
settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice
action or claim shall report . . . information respecting the payment and
circumstances thereof.
Section 11151(7) then defines a "medical malpractice action or claim" as
"a written claim or demand for payment based on a health care provider's
furnishing (or failure to furnish) health care services, and includes the filing
of a cause of action, based on the law of tort, brought in any court of any
State or the United States seeking monetary damages." A failure to report
under this provision subjects the violator to a civil money penalty initially set
at $10,000, per § 11131(c). 7 7
The NPDB is not merely a dusty repository of facts. Section 11135(a)(1)
requires hospitals to check the Data Bank regularly-initially, when a
physician first applies to join its medical staff or to be granted privileges, and
every two years thereafter. Other entities, such as managed care
organizations, are permitted to access the information,78 but hospitals are
affirmatively required to make these regular checks. Likely this provision
arose because, in the mid-i 980s when HCQIA was enacted, most physicians
75 42 U.S.C. § 11 133(a)(1) (2006).
76 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2006). Of note, data collection extends to other practitioners
besides physicians. See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(3) (2006) ("The term 'physician' means a
doctor of medicine or osteopathy or a doctor of dental surgery or medical dentistry
legally authorized to practice medicine and surgery or dentistry by a State (or any
individual who, without authority holds himself or herself out to be so authorized).").
More recently, the Data Bank's purview expanded to encompass essentially all health
care practitioners and require that any negative finding, not just those related to
competence or professionalism, be reported. See National Practitioner Data Bank for
Adverse Information on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners: Reporting on
Adverse and Negative Actions, 75 Fed. Reg. 4656 (Jan. 28, 2010).
77 That figure is now $11,000. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERVICES, HEALTH
RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK
GUIDEBOOK, at A-4 (2001), available at http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/NPDBGuidebook.pdf [hereinafter, NPDB GUIDEBOOK].
78 42 U.S.C. § 11137(a) (2006).
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maintained at least part of their practice in a hospital setting. Thus hospitals
were fairly well-positioned to identify poorly performing practitioners and
take appropriate action against their privileges. And if such a physician
attempted to start anew in a different location, his or her next hospital would
quickly find out about any prior adverse credentialing or licensure actions or
medical malpractice payments, and either restrict that person's practice or
refuse to provide credentials altogether.
This spectre of subsequent hospitals circumscribing a physician's
medical practice, based on NPDB filings, has caused physicians considerable
concern. There is no minimum dollar threshold for medical malpractice
reports. Even a one-dollar payout must be reported. And that payment will
never be erased from the Data Bank unless the Secretary of DHHS removes
information that is inaccurate or is not reportable. 79 The report will follow
the physician for the rest of his or her career.80
Not surprisingly, a short time after the NPDB began collecting data in
1990, physicians became considerably less willing to settle cases, expressly
79 NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 77, at F-3 ("The Secretary [of DHHS] reviews
disputed reports only for accuracy of factual information and to ensure that the
information was required to be reported."). See also Straznicky v. Desert Springs Hosp.,
642 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1245 (D. Nev. 2009).
80 Dauer & Marcus, supra note 59, at 191 n.30 ("The report is distributed every time
the practitioner applies for new privileges at another facility, regardless of how often that
occurs. There is no sunset for these reports. An NPDB record is forever. See Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994) (requiring the
reporting of malpractice payments and maintenance of those records but not authorizing
the deletion of records).") As noted by Metzloff et al. in their study of mediation in North
Carolina:
Evidence from our study reveals that the Data Bank's reporting requirement is in
fact a major issue in many malpractice cases. The Data Bank was a significant issue
in twenty-five percent of the cases in which a defendant doctor subject to the
reporting requirement was involved (eight of thirty-two cases). In fact, this
percentage significantly understates the importance of the Data Bank issue. In
several of the cases, liability was clear, and, predictably, the Data Bank was not a
concern. In nearly fifty percent of the cases in which liability was an issue, the Data
Bank was expressly referenced (eight of seventeen cases). In each of these cases, the
affected doctor discussed the Data Bank as a major issue in the settlement of the
case. Often, the doctor spoke personally to the mediator about the impact of the Data
Bank.
Thomas B. Metzloff, Ralph A. Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Empirical
Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 148
(1997) (citation omitted).
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because of Data Bank concerns.81 To be sure, the Act emphasizes that a
medical malpractice NPDB entry does not necessarily betoken actual
malpractice.82 Nevertheless, the damage can be real.83
In Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., for instance, a university
physician's privileges were suspended when he complained to his department
chair about residents' inadequate skill levels and offered recommendations
for improvements. 84 The Medical Executive Committee suspended his privileges
and ordered him to undergo drug testing and various physical and
mental examinations. The university president then terminated his
employment because his privileges had been suspended, and the ensuing
NPDB report cited various complaints against the physician. 85 Shortly
thereafter, "other health care facilities notified Chudacoff that his privileges
81 See Waters et al., supra note 64, at 290; Smarr, supra note 64, at 71. See also
Mello & Gallagher, supra note 64, at 1355.
82 42 U.S.C. § 11137(d) (2006) ("In interpreting information reported under this
subchapter, a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be
construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred."). See also 45
C.F.R. § 60.7(d) (2010).
83 Hetzler, supra note 40, at 905. As noted by Dale Hetzler when describing his
efforts to mediate comprehensive agreements at Children's Healthcare of Atlanta:
When a case involves physicians, great concern surrounds the advisability of
settlement when liability is not clear. Unreconcilable expert opinions may make it
unclear whether a jury would hold a physician responsible at trial. With their
professional reputations at stake, physicians are appropriately cautious about using
this approach. Until the government aligns the system of regulating the practice of
medicine and reporting the resolutions of claims with the interest-based claims
resolution process of disclosure and system improvement, comprehensive progress
is not likely.
As likewise noted by Florence Yee:
Doctors fear reported settlement information can directly or indirectly
negatively impact their ability to maintain good standing with their malpractice
carriers, providers, peers, and patients, and may even jeopardize hospital staff
privileges and medical board status. Therefore, physicians would rather bet on
winning through litigation than attempting mediation because of the pain of a
generally punitive reporting system.
Yee, supra note 3, at 430. Yee goes on to note that the fears concern not just removal
of existing privileges, but an inability to gain privileges at new sites, or to gain entry to
managed care organizations. Id. at 430 n. 180.
84 Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1165 (D. Nev.
2009).
85 Id. at 1166.
130
[Vol. 27:1 2012]
THE VIRTUES OF DODGING THE DATA BANK
had been denied or revoked because of the information listed on the
NPDB." 86 As the District of Nevada court observed, in finding that the
hospital had not observed the procedural requisites of due process:
The private interest at stake here is the ability to practice medicine at a
particular location. The interest extends further, however, in that a
suspension of privileges at one hospital, when reported to the NPDB, could
limit a physician's ability to practice anywhere in the country. The amount
of process must accord sufficient respect for a professional's life and
livelihood.87
In Doe v. Cmty Med. Ctr., Inc.,88 the Montana Supreme Court similarly
held:
[W]e agree that Dr. Doe has demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm
if CMC [Community Medical Center] is allowed to report his suspension
prior to the resolution of the underlying merits of this case. . . . [A] ringing
bell cannot be unrung. An erroneous report announcing to all interested
parties that a physician is being investigated or suspended for unethical
activity or impairment has the potential for immediate harm as well as
permanent harm, even if later retracted. 89
86
,1d.
87 Id. at 1173. The court went on:
Next, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is also significant, as an improper
suspension would have dramatic consequences for the physician. Additionally, the
NPDB only serves as a reliable source of information if it receives accurate reports;
an erroneous report reduces the NPDB's utility. As a result, there are substantial
benefits to having procedural safeguards in place to protect both the physician and
the NPDB from erroneous or improper reporting. Both are best served by having the
safeguards in place on the front-end of the decision-making process; neither is
served by remedial provisions. Once the damage is done, it is hard to undo.
88 Doe v. Cmty Med. Ctr. Inc., 221 P.3d 651 (Mont. 2009).
89 Id. In a similar case, another Dr. Doe pointed out to the court, "Since hospitals
must consult the NPDB every time a physician applies for clinical privileges or is placed
on staff, that he could be denied privileges by a hospital on the basis of the information
contained in the revised Report, which would result in yet another NPDB entry which
would 'reflect unfavorably upon him."' Doe v. Thompson, 332 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127
(D.D.C. 2004).
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Cole v. St. James Healthcare90 featured a physician whose privileges had
been restricted on grounds of allegedly inappropriate behavior. Noting the
potential harm of a Data Bank entry, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's restoration of privileges until the hospital could conduct a
proper review in accordance with its own bylaws. 91
To be sure, these examples concern a different sort of Data Bank entries
than those discussed here-hospital credentialing decisions rather than
medical malpractice payments. Nevertheless, physicians are reluctant to
incur any sort of Data Bank entry, for reasons discussed just above.
B. Legal Options for Avoiding NPDB Reports
Although the Data Bank thus poses a significant deterrent to early
resolution, physicians can in fact settle early and avoid a Data Bank report
via a number of mechanisms.
1. Provider Pays Out ofPocket
Per HCQIA, "[e]ach entity (including an insurance company) which
makes payment under a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in
settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a
medical malpractice action or claim shall report . .. information respecting
the payment and circumstances thereof." 92 Although initially DHHS
guidelines required that any payment made by a "person or entity" must be
reported, this statutory interpretation was rejected by the D.C. Circuit Court
90 Cole v. St. James Healthcare, 199 P.3d 810, 812 (Mont. 2008).
91 Id. at 815. The court noted the potential harm implicit in insufficient procedural
protections:
If D. Cole is correct, and St. James has breached the Bylaws, the effects of the
breach on Dr. Cole's reputation could be permanent. The District Court restored Dr.
Cole to his status as an active staff member, restrained St. James from adopting the
recommendation of the challenged Matovich investigation, and from taking any
further adverse action on Dr. Cole's application. The court's injunction protects both
Dr. Cole's patients and his professional reputation, at a minimal cost to St. James.
See also Elisabeth Ryzen, The National Practitioner Data Bank-Problems and
Proposed Reforms, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 444 n.189 (1992) (describing a Texas
provision in which temporary medical licenses may not be issued to physicians whose
NPDB report indicates medical malpractice payments, adverse licensure, or clinical
privilege actions).
92 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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of Appeals in 1993. In Am. Dental Ass'n v. Shalala, a dentist who had paid a
malpractice claim out of pocket was reported to the Data Bank.9 3 The
dentist's efforts to remove that report were unsuccessful, and the District
Court agreed with DHHS that any payment made by a person or entity must
be reported to the NPDB. 94
The Circuit Court reversed, however, based on careful statutory analysis.
If Congress's intent is clear, the court opined, there is no need to carry the
analysis further.95 And in this case Congress was quite clear:
[The HCQIA] reveals unmistakably that Congress did not intend to
encompass any individual doctor or dentist as an "entity" that must report to
the National Practitioner Data Bank. The Act does not define "entity," but
the term as used in the Act refers uniformly to groups and organizations. ...
[A]ll of the textual evidence points in one direction: Congress did not intend
the term 'entity' to encompass individual practitioners. ....We find great
significance in the fact that Congress chose to use only the term "entity" in
setting out the requirement to report malpractice payments.96
The Secretary of DHHS subsequently revised its guidelines, which now
state quite clearly that practitioners' payments out of pocket do not require
any report. 97
93 Am. Dental Ass'n v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 445, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
94 Id. at 448.
95 Id. at 446.
96 Id. at 446-47.
97 NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 77, at E-10:
Individual subjects are not required to report payments they make for their own
benefit to the NPDB. On August 27, 1993, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that ... the NPDB regulation requiring each 'person or
entity' that makes a medical malpractice payment was invalid, insofar as it required
individuals to report such payments. . . . [I]f a practitioner or other person, rather
than a professional corporation or other business entity, makes a medical
malpractice payment out of personal funds, the payment is not reportable.
See also id. at E- 16 ("Payment is made based only on oral demands. No report is
required.").
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2. Waiver of Debt or Refund of Payment; Loss Adjustment
Expenses
A physician who forgives a patient's debt or refunds a prior payment
need not report to the Data Bank: "A waiver of a debt is not considered a
payment and should not be reported to the NPDB. For example, if a patient
has an adverse reaction to an injection and is willing to accept a waiver of fee
as settlement, that waiver is not reportable to the NPDB." 98
In a similar fashion, loss adjustment expenses (LAEs) such as attorney
fees, expert witness fees, and copying fees need not be reported unless they
are actually made part of a medical malpractice payment.99
3. Phone or Other Nonwritten Communication of Demand for
Payment
The key trigger requiring a report for a medical malpractice payment is
"a written claim or demand for payment based on a health care provider's
furnishing (or failure to furnish) health care services. . . ."1oo If a plaintiff or
her attorney makes claim or demand for payment in a nonwritten form, such
as by telephone or by direct person-to-person conversation, any money paid
to settle that claim need not be reported.' 0 ' DHHS's NPDB Guidebook
clarifies: "For purposes of NPDB reporting, medical malpractice payments
are limited to exchanges of money. A refund of a fee is reportable only if it
results from a written complaint or claim demanding monetary payment for
98 Id. at E-12. See also 45 C.F.R. § 60.7(a) (2010) ("For purposes of this section, the
waiver of an outstanding debt is not construed as a 'payment' and is not required to be
reported."). But c.f NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 77, at E-12 ("[i]f a refund of a
practitioner's fee is made by an entity (including solo incorporated practitioners), that
payment is reportable to the NPDB.").
99 NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 77, at E- 12. See also id. at E-3 1:
Question 15: "If there is no medical malpractice payment and Loss Adjustment
Expenses (LAEs) are paid in order to release or dismiss a healthcare practitioner
from a medical malpractice suit, should the LAE be reported?"
Answer: "No. If LAEs are not included in the medical malpractice payment, then
they should not be reported to the NPDB."
100 42 U.S.C. § 11151(7) (2006).
101 NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 77, at E-12.
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damages."l 02 DHHS removes any lingering doubt in its question and answer
examples:
Question 10: If a patient makes an oral demand for a refund for services, is
the resulting payment reportable to the NPDB?
Answer: No. Only payments resulting from written demands are reportable
to the NPDB. Even if the practitioner transmits the demand in writing to the
medical malpractice payer, the payment is not reportable if the patient's
only demand was oral. However, if a subsequent written claim or demand is
received from the patient and results in a payment, that payment is
reportable. 103
Needless to say, plaintiffs who wish to pursue a claim by oral
notification must be mindful about statutes of limitation, lest they be caught
in a situation where oral negotiations fail sometime after the statute has run.
Just as plaintiffs and their attorneys can promote early resolution via oral
rather than written notification of a potential suit, so can physicians initiate
oral communication where they believe they may have erred or otherwise
caused an adverse outcome. Just as many hospitals have discovered
reductions in filed claims, time to settlement, and defense costs 104 physicians
who attempt early resolution through nonwritten communication may be in a
good position to achieve a settlement without incurring a Data Bank
report. 05
4. Contractual Agreement or Statutory Mandate for Pre-Suit
Mediation
Some institutions, such as Drexel University College of Medicine, invite
patients to sign a voluntary mediation agreement. 106 By statute, South
Carolina requires mediation prior to filing a medical malpractice claim:
102 Id. at E- 12 (emphasis in original).
103 Id. at E-3 1, Question 10.
104 See supra Part lB.
105 Somewhat analogously, a number of states have enacted statutes insulating
physicians' apologies and expressions of sympathy from being used as evidence if
litigation later ensues-although such measures may not provide all the advantages their
framers envisioned. See generally Mastroianni et al, supra note 39 at 1611-18; Marlynn
Wei, Doctors, Apologies, and the Law: An Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, 39 J.
HEALTH LAw 107 (2007).
106 See Yee, supra note 3, at 443 n.233; Christopher Guadagnino, Malpractice
Mediation Poised to Expand, PHYsICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST (April 2004). To view the
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Within ninety days and no later than one hundred twenty days from the
service of the Notice of Intent to File Suit, the parties shall participate in a
mediation conference unless an extension for no more than sixty days is
granted by the court based upon a finding of good cause.107
West Virginia does not mandate that parties mediate pre-suit, but does
provide defendants with the option of requiring the plaintiff to mediate, once
they have received pre-suit notification of plaintiffs intent to sue. A
prospective physician-defendant thus can require pre-suit mediation. 0 8
In these cases where a written demand asks not for payment of money,
but simply for a voluntary conversation whose usual purpose is to achieve a
resolution while avoiding litigation, the plain language of the statute suggests
that an NPDB report is not required. In other words, a written demand to
discuss does not constitute a written demand for payment. If a settlement
ensues, plain language further would imply that the money was not paid in
response to a written claim or demand for payment.
5. High-Low Agreements
In some cases, parties wishing to limit risk will make an agreement prior
to trial that, whatever the jury outcome, money will be paid within agreed
mediation agreement patients are invited to sign, see
http://www.drexelmed.edu/documents/mediation/mediationagreement.pdf. To view the
pamphlet accompanying that agreement, see
http://www.drexelmed.edu/portals/l/NewMediationPatientBooklet-
CHI-final_2_setpO9_3_.pdf.
107 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125(C) (2010). Of note, this mediation mandate
accompanies a requirement that potential plaintiffs file a notice of intent to file a suit and
an expert affidavit, after which parties may subpoena relevant documents. See also S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-79-120 (2010): "At any time before a medical malpractice action is
brought to trial, the parties shall participate in mediation. ... Parties may also agree to
participate in binding arbitration, nonbinding arbitration, early neutral evaluation, or
other forms of alternative dispute resolution." This latter version, unlike § 15-79-125,
envisions a mediation taking place after, rather than before, the patient has actually filed
suit. As discussed later in Part III, pre-trial settlement should not be confused with pre-
suit settlement.
108 "Upon receipt of the notice of claim or of the screening certificate of merit, if the
claimant is proceeding pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, the
health care provider is entitled to pre-litigation mediation before a qualified mediator
upon written demand to the claimant." W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(f) (Lexis 2008)
(emphasis added). Pre-suit resolution will be discussed further in Part III, infra.
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parameters. Where the defendant practitioner prevails, she will not be
reported even though money is paid. Per the NPDB Guidebook:
A "high-low" agreement, a contractual agreement between a plaintiff and a
defendant's insurer, defines the parameters of a payment the plaintiff may
receive after a trial or arbitration proceeding. If the finder of fact returns a
defense verdict, the defendant's insurer agrees to pay the "low end" amount
to the plaintiff. If the finder of fact returns a verdict for the plaintiff and
against the defendant, the defendant's insurer agrees to pay the "high end"
amount to the plaintiff.
A payment made at the low end of a high/low agreement that is in place
prior to a verdict or an arbitration decision would not be reportable to the
NPDB only if the fact-finder rules in favor of the defendant and assigns no
liability to the defendant practitioner. In this case, the payment is not being
made for the benefit of the practitioner in settlement of a medical
malpractice claim. Rather, it is being made pursuant to an independent
contract between the defendant's insurer and the plaintiff. ... Note: in order
for the low-end payment to be exempted from the reporting requirements,
the fact finder must have made a determination regarding liability at the
trial or arbitration proceeding.109
6. Corporate Shield
A well-recognized but somewhat more controversial avenue for
resolving a medical malpractice claim without necessitating a Data Bank
report has been dubbed the "corporate shield." The NPDB Guidebook states
that (1) where an entity such as a hospital or clinic makes a payment in a suit
that does not identify an individual practitioner, no Data Bank report is
109 NPDB Guidebook, supra note 77, at E- 13 (emphasis in original). The Guidebook
continues:
A payment made at the high end of the agreement is one made for the benefit of the
practitioner and, therefore, must be reported to the NPDB. When a defendant
practitioner has been found to be liable by a fact-finding authority, such as a judge,
a jury, or by arbitration, any payment made pursuant to that finding must be
reported, regardless of the existence of a high-low agreement.
If a high-low agreement is in place, and the plaintiff and defendant settle the case
prior to trial, the existence of the high-low agreement does not alter the reportability
of the settlement payment.
Id.
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required"t0 and (2) where a practitioner is dismissed from a lawsuit prior to
the settlement or judgment, no report need be made. II
In essence:
the corporate shield refers to the situation where the medical corporation for
which the doctor works is named in the suit, and the doctor is either not
originally named or is released specifically for the purpose of avoiding a
report to the NPDB. There is evidence that some insurers will 'cut a deal'
with the plaintiffs attorney to dismiss the doctor from the suit and let the
payment be made entirely on behalf of the corporation, hospital, or other
entity. 112
By the mid-1990s, somewhere around 50% of otherwise-required NPDB
reports were thought to be diverted via the corporate shield.113
110 "A payment made as a result of a suit or claim solely against an entity (for
example, a hospital, clinic, or group practice) and that does not identify an individual
practitioner is not reportable under the NPDB's current regulations." Id at E-8.
In order for a particular physician, dentist, or other health care practitioner to be
named in an MMPR submitted to the NPDB, the practitioner must be named in both
the written complaint or claim demanding monetary payment for damages and the
settlement release or final adjudication, if any. Practitioners named in the release,
but not in the written demand or as defendants in the lawsuit, are not reportable to
the NPDB. A practitioner named in the written complaint or claim who is
subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit and not named in the settlement release is
not reportable to the NPDB.
Id. at E-I.
Ill As the NPDB Guidebook notes:
A payment made to settle a medical malpractice claim or action is not reportable to
the NPDB if the defendant health care practitioner is dismissed from the lawsuit
prior to the settlement or judgment. However, if the dismissal results from a
condition in the settlement or release, then the payment is reportable. In the first
instance, there is no payment for the benefit of the health care practitioner because
the individual has been dismissed from the action independently of the settlement or
release. In the latter instance, if the practitioner is dismissed from the lawsuit in
consideration of the payment being made in settlement of the lawsuit, the payment
can only be construed as a payment for the benefit of the health care practitioner and
must be reported to the NPDB.
Id. at E-12-13.
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DHHS has long recognized this phenomenon and, over time, has
considered whether to limit its use. 114 A GAO study in 2000 expressly
acknowledged DHHS's ambivalence, given that a significant change in these
rules could "interfere with settlement negotiations between the insurer and
the claimant." 15
114 John F. Bales III, Medical Malpractice Developments, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE 1994, AT 563, 625-26 (PLI COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE, COURSE
HANDBOOK SER. No. 700, 1994).
115 Per the GAO report:
Soon after NPDB began operating in 1990, HRSA officials became aware that under
the data bank's regulations, some practitioners, who may have committed
malpractice, were not being reported because of what has become known as the
"corporate shield." NPDB regulations require that only the practitioners named in
final malpractice settlements be reported to the data bank. The corporate shield
occurs when individuals filing malpractice claims remove the practitioner's name
from the claim, leaving only the hospital or another corporate entity identified as the
responsible party. When this happens, no report is submitted to NPDB. HRSA
officials believe that practitioners who have committed malpractice use the
corporate shield to avoid being reported. However, they have not been able to
quantify the extent to which the corporate shield is used for such purposes. In
addition, the agency has not found a means of successfully addressing this issue in a
way that would also have the support of industry representatives on NPDB's
Executive Committee, who could facilitate compliance by persuading member
organizations to adopt this policy change.
In December 1998, HRSA proposed changing NPDB's malpractice payment
reporting regulations. The proposal would have required that insurers report all
practitioners for whose benefit a payment is made, including those practitioners who
might not have been named in the final settlement or even in the initial malpractice
claim. The health care industry-including those organizations on NPDB's
Executive Committee-overwhelmingly opposed the proposal, arguing that it would
interfere with settlement negotiations between the insurer and the claimant. The
industry also argued that reporting all initially named practitioners would deny due
process to those not found liable by the court. HRSA subsequently withdrew the
proposal and initiated other strategies to solve this problem while working to gain
NPDB Executive Committee support for a change in medical malpractice reporting
requirements.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-130, NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK: MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK's RELIABILITY, at
11 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01130.pdf.
See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT at 30, available at http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2005NPDBAnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter "NPDB 2005
Annual Report"]:
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Notwithstanding episodic controversies regarding the corporate shield, it
has proved to be an important asset in current efforts to promote early dispute
resolution and to focus on addressing injured patients' and families' goals
and needs while emphasizing broad communication that can better improve
safety and quality of care. 116
The University of Michigan Health System avowedly uses the corporate
shield, and its settlements are generally in the institution's name. UMHS is a
staff-model institution in which physicians are employees rather than
independent contractors, hence under this approach "reporting of individual
caregivers in medical malpractice claims in the National Practitioner Data
Bank is rare. However, full claims histories are maintained and reported for
each involved caregiver, as required." 17 In other words, UMHS emphasizes
thorough internal peer review as part of its overall quality process. Even
though it rarely reports medical malpractice payments, it still actively reports
adverse actions on a provider's privileges or credentials to the NPDB.11 8
Further discussion of the "moral hazard" issues that arise when providers
systematically avoid making Data Bank reports via these exceptions will be
taken up in Part IV. Suffice it here to say that rapid changes in the current
health care market make possible a significantly greater use of the corporate
"Corporate Shield" may mask the extent of substandard care and diminish NPDB's
usefulness as a flagging system: Malpractice payment reporting may be affected by
use of the "corporate shield." Attorneys have worked out arrangements in which the
name of a health care organization (e.g., a hospital or group practice) is substituted
for the name of the practitioner, who would otherwise be reported to the NPDB.
This is most common when the health care organization is responsible for the
malpractice coverage of the practitioner. Under current NPDB regulations, if a
practitioner is named in the claim but not in the settlement, no report about the
practitioner is filed with the NPDB unless the practitioner is excluded from the
settlement as a condition of the settlement.
See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, at 34, available at http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2006NPDBAnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter "NPDB 2006
Annual Report"]. Of note, the most recent NPDB Annual Report does not discuss
corporate shield issues. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK COMBINED ANNUAL REPORT 2007, 2008, AND 2009, issued
September 2011, available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2007-
08-09NPDBAnnualRep.pdf [hereinafter NPDB 2007-2009 Annual Report].
116 See Kachalia et al., supra note 45, at 214. UMHS tries to emphasize "honesty
and transparency with patients and staff, regardless of whether events resulted from error,
and encourages staff to enlist risk management in the disclosure process." Id.
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shield, with the emergence of Accountable Care Organizations, bundled
payment arrangements, hospital purchases of physician practices, and other
structures that may make it more attractive and appropriate for hospitals and
other entities to provide "enterprise liability." 119 To the extent that the
corporate shield remains permissible, and to the extent it becomes
increasingly utilized by complex provider structures, physicians can find
expanding opportunities to participate in early mediation of health care
disputes without incurring a permanent black mark in the Data Bank.
7. Pre-Suit Notification Period
Finally, a number of states have enacted statutes mandating that, before
the plaintiff is permitted to file a medical malpractice claim, he or she must
provide advance notification to the defendant. Although these notices must
generally be in writing and may require considerable specificity, arguably
they do not constitute a "written claim or demand for payment," but rather,
simply an alert that in the future there will likely be such a claim. If so, then
payments made during the pre-suit notification period would not be
reportable. These statutes are the focus of Part III.
III. PRE-SUIT NOTIFICATION STATUTES AND NPDB REPORTS
A. Statute Characteristics
In recent years a number of states have enacted legislation requiring
plaintiffs to provide defendants with advance notice of their intent to file a
119 Mark C. Shields, Jankaj H. Patel, Martin Manning & Lee Sacks, A Model for
Integrating Independent Physicians into Accountable Care Organizations, 30 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1 (2011); Paul R. DeMuro, Community Physicians Participating in Accountable
Care Organizations through Clinical Integration, 22 THE HEALTH LAWYER 13 (2010);
Thomas L. Greaney, Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Accountable Care
Organizations-The Fork in the Road, 263 NEW ENGL. J. MED. e 1 (2011). See also
William M. Sage & JM Jorling, A World That Won't Stand Still: Enterprise Liability by
Private Contract, 43 DEPAuL LAW REv. 1007 (1994); William M. Sage, Enterprise
Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
159 (1997); Patients' Role in Accountable Care Organizations, 363 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
2583 (2011); see also, e.g., Jeroen N. Struijs & Caroline A Baan, Integrating Care
Through Bundled Payments-Lessons from the Netherlands, 364 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 990
(2011); Avery Johnson, The Model of the Future? The Health-Care Law Promoted
Accountable-Care Organizations. But It's Hard to Know What They Are, WALL ST. J.
(March 28, 2011), at R6.
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medical malpractice claim. West Virginia requires thirty days' notice, 120 for
instance, while Tennessee, Texas, and Mississippi each require sixty days.12 1
States requiring ninety days include Utah, Florida, California, and the
District of Columbia. 122 Somewhat indirectly, Louisiana 123 and South
Carolina 24 also set 90 days. Michigan provides the longest pre-suit notice
period, at 182 days.125 Three states have either repealed a pre-suit notice
statutel 26 or have seen it judicially overturned. 127
These statutes share the same basic purposes: "to promote settlement
without the need for formal litigation and reduce the cost of medical
malpractice litigation while still providing compensation for meritorious
medical malpractice claims that might otherwise be precluded from recovery
because of litigation costs." 128 "The purpose of an intent to sue notice is to
120 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(b) (Lexis 2008); see also 55-7B-6(f) (2010) ("provider
may be entitled to pre-litigation mediation upon written demand to claimant").
121 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (2011); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. (WEST 2011) § 74.051(a); MIss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36(15) (2011).
122 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-412 (West 1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(2),
(3)(a) (West 2007); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(a); D.C. CODE § 16-2802 (2011).
123 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(1)(a), (2)(a), (B)(1) (stating medical
malpractice claims must begin with request for review panel, which then suspends for 90
days the time within which suit must be filed).
124 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (requiring notice of intent to be followed by
mediation in 90-120 days; suit may not be filed until after mediator determines impasse
exists or mediation should end, within 60 days thereafter).
125 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912b.
126 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (2011) (repealed by statute); see Harris v.
DiMattina, 462 S.E.2d 338 (Va. 1995).
127 See Waples v. Yi, 234 P. 3d 187 (Wash. 2010) (ruling Washington statute RCW
7.70.100(1) (2006) unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers); Carson v.
Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (ruling New Hampshire statute N.H. Rev. Stat. § 507
C:5 unconstitutional as violating equal protection). But see, e.g., Thomas v. Warden, 999
So. 2d 842, 847 (Miss. 2008); Wimley v. Reid, 991 So. 2d 135, 137-38 (Miss. 2008);
Pearlstien v. Malunney, 500 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1896), rev. denied, 511
So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1987) (expressly upholding the constitutionality of pre-suit notification);
Neal v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 575 N.W.2d 68, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Waples v. Yi,
234 P. 3d 192 (Wash. 2010) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
128 Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 575 N.W.2d at 71, 75; see also DeCosta v. Gossage, 782
N.W. 2d 734, 735 (Mich. 2010) (stating that it is in the furtherance of justice to disregard
any error or defect ... to promote settlement in the place of formal litigation).
142
[Vol. 27:1 2012]
THE VIRTUES OF DODGING THE DATA BANK
give the parties an opportunity to discuss, and hopefully to resolve, the
potential claim before they become locked into a lawsuit."l 29
At this point the question arises whether any payments an insurer makes
on a physician's behalf during this pre-suit period must be reported to the
Data Bank. If these payments must be reported the same as when the plaintiff
has formally filed suit, these statutes' objectives will be largely upended. If
physicians still need to avoid a permanent "black mark" in the NPDB at this
early point, then they will still have the same motivation to abjure early
mediation and hold out for victory at trial.
B. Insurer Concerns
As it happens, some medical malpractice insurers do report a settlement
made during this pre-suit period. There are several reasons.
First, some of these statutes require a fair amount of information to be
provided with the pre-suit notice of intent, so that the notice looks rather like
a filed claim. South Carolina, for instance, requires that the pre-suit notice
"must name all adverse parties as defendants, must contain a short and plain
statement of the facts showing that the party filing the notice is entitled to
relief, must be signed by the plaintiff or by his attorney, and must include
any standard interrogatories or similar disclosures required by the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."' 30 The notice must ordinarily be in
writing and must be delivered in specified ways.131
12 9 Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983). See also
Jenkins v. Marvel, 683 F. Supp. 2d 626, 639 (E.D. Tenn. 2010); Hill v. Russell, 247
S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387, 393-94
(W. Va. 2005) (stating that the purpose of a notice of intent to sue is to give the defendant
notice of the incident in order to allow investigation of the matter and promote pre-suit
settlement of the claim); Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993) (stating
that the purpose of the Chapter 766 pre-suit requirements is to alleviate the high cost of
medical negligence claims through early determination and prompt resolution of claims,
not to deny access to the courts to plaintiffs); Solimando v. Int'l Med. Ctrs., 544 So. 2d
1031, 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Dallas, 652
S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1983).
130 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125(A) (2010).
131 West Virginia requires certified mail, return receipt requested. W. VA. CODE §
55-7B-6(b) (Lexis 2008). Tennessee requires written notice to each prospective defendant
and requires that it be mailed both to the provider's current business address and to the
address listed with the state's department of health. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(a)(1)
(2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) (2010). See also, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. § 600.2912b(2) (WEST 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-412(3) (West
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Michigan, similarly, requires that the notice state:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of
practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve
compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of
practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the
claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim.132
The trigger mandating a report to the Data Bank is a "written claim or
demand for payment ... ."133 If these notices must be written, and if in all
this detail they can be interpreted as a demand for payment, then insurers
may infer it best to be on the "safe" side, and report any pre-suit settlement
payment.
Second, and again analogous to litigation, some states provide that
informal discovery should take place following such pre-suit notice. Florida,
for instance, requires that "[u]pon receipt by a prospective defendant of a
notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information available
without formal discovery. Failure to do so is grounds for dismissal of claims
or defenses ultimately asserted." 134 Potential litigants may then obtain
unswom statements, medical records, documents and things, mental and
physical examinations and other information useful for determining whether
litigation should ultimately proceed.
Third, insurers point out that once the pre-suit notice is issued and the
parties express interest in mediation, parties may well exchange written
proposals to establish "ballpark" monetary settlement figures prior to the
actual mediation. Perhaps these should be construed as written demands, an
insurer might suppose.
Fourth, actual notice letters from plaintiff attorneys sometimes-perhaps
commonly-move quickly from the language of "potential claim" to the
1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(2)(a) (WEST 2007); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 74.05 1(a) (West 2009).
132 IICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2912b(4) (WEST 2003).
133 42 U.S.C. § 11151(7) (2006).
134 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(6)(a) (West 2007).
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language of "claim." See Figures 1-4.135 If the attorney herself calls it a
claim, then insurers may infer that perhaps it really is a claim and must be
treated as such, for NPDB reporting purposes.
l am the attorney bepresening OWN
MMwit of.ld Throqh me and my Sun,
al e aserting a potential claim for medical Mlpracae agaat yow
profbasional corporati Ths claim azises out of care provided by emloyess,
shareholder, mombem, and/or agents, a
, andby other individuals acting-on behalf of
Figure 1: "potential claim" in the second sentence becomes "claim" in
the third sentence.
D arggi
I am the atorney representing the legal representative of s
Tloushme and my fhm s assaeting a potential claim
for medical malpractice against you. This claim arises out of care prwided byyou to your patient,
a t or about
Figure 2: "potential claim" becomes "claim."
Dear r
I am the attomey representing the surviving family members ofm
Through me and my firm, the family members are asserting
a potential claim for medical malpractice against you. This claim arises out of
care provided by you to your patie, -Iat the home municipally
known as on or about=
Figure 3: "potential claim" becomes "claim."
145
135 Letter excerpts provided here are genuine pre-suit notifications, although names
have been redacted to preserve confidentiality.
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Dcar and To Whom It May Concem:
Please be adv*acd that ardm ae
herebygiigJD h() writion notice, pursuant to Tenn. Code Amn. 129-26-121, that a medical
malpractice claim may be filed against it within the time period required by law based
upon the medical negligence of acting through its principals,
agents, employees, doctors, and nurses, in rnding care and treatment to W
begining in .Thi claim relates to personal injuries
sustained by and loss of consortium .damages sustained by
The medical malpractice claim will be filed byr n
Figure 4: "claim may be filed" becomes "this claim" and "[t]he medical
malpractice claim."
The answer to this last concern seems obvious. Plaintiff attorneys should
consistently avoid using "claim" without an appropriate qualifier such as
"potential" or "possible." Even with this fix, however, we must still consider
insurers' other three concerns, namely, that these notices are in writing, that
they may feature elements that strongly resemble a classic medical
malpractice claim, and that written monetary proposals may be exchanged
before and during mediation.
C. Data Bank Report: Arguably Not Required During Pre-Suit
Notification Period
Several arguments support the conclusion that, notwithstanding the
superficial resemblance between a filed malpractice suit and a pre-suit notice,
a monetary payout made after a pre-suit notice but prior to a filed claim does
not require a Data Bank report.
First we must look to the plain language of the federal statute and to the
plain language of the various state statutes. Plain language figured
prominently in the only appellate case reasonably on point. As discussed
above, in Am. Dental Ass 'n v. Shalala, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
invoked an extensive plain-language analysis to find that an "entity" paying
on behalf of a practitioner does not encompass an individual person. 136
136 Am. Dental Ass'n v. Shalala, 3 F.3d at 445. See supra Part II-B-1. Per HCQIA,
"[e]ach entity (including an insurance company) which makes payment under a policy of
insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in
satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim shall report . 42
U.S.C. § 11131(a) (2006).
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Therefore, the court concluded, a practitioner need not report out-of-pocket
payments to the Data Bank. Per the court, the HCQIA:
reveals unmistakably that Congress did not intend to encompass any
individual doctor or dentist as an "entity" that must report to the National
Practitioner Data Bank. The Act does not define "entity' but the term as
used in the Act refers uniformly to groups and organizations. ... [A]ll of the
textual evidence points in one direction: Congress did not intend the term
"entity" to encompass individual practitioners. 137
Five years later the D.C. district court likewise undertook careful
analysis of the statute's plain language regarding what counts as and
"investigation" by an "institution," to conclude that a Data Bank report
should not have been made in a case where a few senior members of a
surgery department began monitoring a surgeon colleague's performance. 138
Here, as we consider pre-suit notices, HCQIA's language requires that an
entity such as an insurer file a report when it makes payment on a physician's
behalf in connection with a medical malpractice action or claim. 139 A
"medical malpractice action or claim," in turn, is a "written claim or demand
for payment based on a health care provider's furnishing (or failure to
furnish) health care services ... ."140 Thus, we must parse carefully the words
"written claim or demand for payment." As noted above, DHHS already
recognizes that the statute must be read precisely as it is written, as it
concedes, e.g., that an oral claim or demand for payment will not trigger a
Data Bank report141 because it is not "written." Accordingly, our question is
whether a pre-suit notice constitutes a "written claim or demand for
payment."
A brief review of the relevant state statutes suggests that, under a plain
language analysis, these notices do not. Although written, these notices are
not a "claim or demand for payment." Rather, they are a notification about a
potential, future claim or demand. Michigan, for instance, mandates that "a
137 Id. at 446-47.
138 Simpkins v. Shalala, 999 F. Supp. 106, 114 (D.D.C. 1998). Somewhat in
contrast, a Kentucky court found that, under a significantly different fact pattern, a bona
fide investigation had been commenced by an institution, thereby requiring a Data Bank
report. See Omar v. Jewish Hosp. Healthcare Servs., 153 S.W.3d 845, 846 (Ky. Ct. App.
2005).
139 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (2006).
140 42 U.S.C. § 11151(7) (2006).
141 NPDB Guidebook, supra note 77, at E- 16 ("Payment is made based only on oral
demands. No report is required.").
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person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a
health professional . .. unless the person has given . .. written notice under
this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced." 42 In
other words, a written claim or demand for payment cannot be made unless
the prior notice mandate has first been satisfied.
Tennessee emphasizes that this notice describes a "potential claim" 143
and expressly states that the notice must be provided "before the filing of a
complaint."l 44 Texas' statute provides similar wording. 145 Mississippi and
California both use the comparable language of "prior written notice" or
"prior notice of the intention."146 Plain language says that a "potential" claim
is merely a possibility of a future claim-not an actual present demand, and
that a notice which must be sent before a complaint can be filed can not,
itself, be that complaint.
Indeed, a number of states have expressly dubbed their required pre-suit
notification a "condition precedent" to filing a claim. Again, plain language
suggests that a condition precedent to a filed claim can not, itself, be such a
claim. Thus, the Mississippi Supreme Court held in Wimley v. Reid 47 that
"pre-suit requirements are clearly within the purview of the Legislature, and
do not encroach upon this Court's rulemaking responsibility. Indeed, we
consistently have held that the Legislature has authority to establish pre-suit
requirements as a condition precedent to filing particular kinds of
142 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2912b(1) (2003) (emphasis added).
143 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (2011): "Any person, or that person's
authorized agent, asserting a potential claim for medical malpractice shall give written
notice of the potential claim to each health care provider that will be a named defendant
at least sixty (60) days before the filing of a complaint based upon medical malpractice in
any court of this state" (emphasis added).
144 Id. at § 29.
145 TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. § 74.051(a)ii (2009) "Any person or his authorized
agent asserting a health care liability claim shall give written notice of such claim... . to
each physician or health care provider against whom such claim is being made at least 60
days before the filing of a suit in any court of this state based upon a health care liability
claim" (emphasis added).
146 MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36(15) (2010) ("No action based upon the health care
provider's professional negligence may be begun unless the defendant has been given at
least sixty (60) days' prior written notice of the intention to begin the action") (emphasis
added); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364 (a) (2011) ("No action based upon the health care
provider's professional negligence may be commenced unless the defendant has been
given at least 90 days' prior notice of the intention to commence the action") (emphasis
added).
147 Wimley, 991 So. 2d at 139. See also Warden, 999 So. 2d at 847.
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lawsuits."' 48 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has held that "[t]imely
written notice of intent to initiate litigation is a condition precedent to
maintaining a medical malpractice action."1 49
Additionally, some states have expressly stated that a pre-suit notice is
not the same thing as a malpractice complaint. Per the Utah Supreme Court:
A notice of intent to sue, as required by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-14-8, is not
intended to be the equivalent of a complaint and need not contain every
allegation and claim set forth in the complaint. The purpose of an intent to
sue notice is to give the parties an opportunity to discuss, and hopefully to
resolve, the potential claim before they become locked into a lawsuit.
Although the notice must include "specific allegations of misconduct on the
part of the prospective defendant," that requirement does not need to meet
the standards required to state a claim for relief in a complaint. The parties
need to give only general notice of an intent to sue and of the injuries then
known and not a statement of legal theories. 150
Likewise, Florida has expressly stated that the informal discovery of pre-
suit negotiations must be assured confidentiality, so as to distinguish these
exchanges of information from the formal discovery of a medical malpractice
action. 151
Similarly, the state of Louisiana requires all malpractice claims initially
to be presented to a medical review panel for pre-litigation screening.
Louisiana statute stipulates that this request can not be reported to the state
148 Wimley, 991 So. 2d at 139.
149 Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1994). See also Oakwood Hosp. Corp.,
575 N.W.2d at 74; Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223, 224-25 (Fla. 1991); Hosp.
Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1990); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d
144, 146 (Utah 1979).
150 Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d at 1183 (§ 78-14-8 now renumbered as §
78B-3-412 by Laws 2008, c. 3, § 718, cff. Feb. 7, 2008).
151
In order to distinguish non-meritorious negligence claims at the earliest point, a free
and open exchange of information during the pre-suit screening process is necessary
and this is more likely to occur if parties are assured confidentiality of information.
For all of these reasons, the legislature distinguished between informal and formal
discovery in a medical malpractice action, see FLA. STAT. § 766.106(6), (2007), and
made it clear that information obtained during pre-suit screening is confidential and
not subject to formal discovery.
Variety Children's Hosp. v. Boice, 27 So. 3d 788, 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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licensing board or any other supervisory body, whereas actual malpractice
claims do require such reporting:
The filing of a request for review by a medical review panel as provided for
in this Section shall not be reportable by any health care provider, the
Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund, or any other entity to the Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners, to any licensing authority, committee, or
board of any other state, or to any credentialing or similar agency,
committee, or board of any clinic, hospital, health insurer, or managed care
company.152
Similar mandates for confidentiality cover mediations and, hence,
address another potential reason why an insurer might feel a need to report a
pre-suit settlement to the NPDB. Mediations commonly involve written pre-
mediation statements that may, indeed, feature proposed settlement terms.
Additionally, intra-mediation negotiations will likewise bandy numbers
about. Typically at least some of these are in writing, and might therefore be
thought of as a written claim or demand.
Nevertheless, such jottings should not be deemed a written claim or
demand for payment under HCQIA. First, mediation by nature does not
feature a "demand" in the relevant sense. Parties of course make proposals
but, because any resolution is completely voluntary and is undertaken as an
alternative to litigation, mediation proposals do not constitute the kind of
"claim" or "demand" contemplated by HCQIA.
More importantly, strong confidentiality provisions generally protect
mediation proceedings in all phases. For one thing, federal and many states'
rules of evidence provide that offers to settle or to compromise are not
admissible if litigation later ensues. Per Federal Rule of Evidence 408,
Compromise and Offers to Compromise:
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on
behalf of any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or
amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach
through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish or accepting or
offering or promising to accept a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise the claim; and
152 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(1)(a) (2008).
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(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding
the claim ..- .153
Many states have comparable rules. Moreover, states and the federal
government also provide specific protections expressly for mediation.
Tennessee, for instance, mandates a thoroughgoing confidentiality in its
Supreme Court Rule 31: "Rule 31 Neutrals shall preserve and maintain the
confidentiality of all information obtained during Rule 31 ADR Proceedings
and shall not divulge information obtained by them during the course of Rule
31 ADR Proceedings without the consent of the parties, except as otherwise
may be required by law."1 54 Mediation confidentiality is also protected in
153 The rule goes on, in (b), to say: "Permitted uses. This rule does not require
exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a).
Examples of permissible purposes include proving a witness's bias or prejudice; negating
a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution."
154 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 § 10(d). See also TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 A, § 7:
Confidentiality
(a) Required
A Neutral shall preserve and maintain the confidentiality of all dispute resolution
proceedings except where required by law to disclose information.
(b) When Disclosure Permitted
A Neutral conducting a Rule 31 Mediation shall keep confidential from the other
parties any information obtained in individual caucuses unless the party to the
caucus permits disclosure.
(c) Records
A Neutral shall maintain confidentiality in storing or disposing of records and shall
render anonymous all identifying information when materials are used for research,
training, or statistical compilations.
See also Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators Stnd. 6: "(a) Confidentiality. A mediator
shall preserve and maintain the confidentiality of all mediation proceedings except where
required by law to disclose information gathered during the mediation."
See also OR. REV. STAT. § 36.262 (1989):
(1) All memoranda, work products and other materials contained in the case files of
a mediator or mediation service are confidential. Any communication made in, or in
connection with, the mediation which relates to the controversy being mediated,
whether made to the mediator or a party, or to any other person if made at a
mediation session, is confidential. However, a mediated agreement shall not be
confidential unless the parties otherwise agree in writing. (2) Confidential materials
and communications are not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative
proceeding except: (a) When all parties to the mediation agree, in writing, to waive
the confidentiality; (b) In a subsequent action between the mediator and a party to
151
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federal rules of court. 155
Although such protections often feature a caveat permitting disclosure if
"otherwise . .. required by law," at no point does HCQIA require disclosure
of mediation negotiations.
Moreover, HCQIA's definition of a "medical malpractice action or
claim" does not appear to include the informal conversations and
proceedings of mediation. The Act illustrates its definition of a "written
claim or demand for payment" by saying that a malpractice action or claim
"includes the filing of a cause of action, based on the law of tort, brought in
any court of any State or the United States seeking monetary damages."l 56
Similarly, the Code of Federal Regulations states such a malpractice claim
"includes the filing of a cause of action based on the law of tort, brought in
any State or Federal Court or other adjudicative body." 5 7 The emphasis on
formal filings with adjudicative bodies thus lends further credence to the
conclusion that private mediation negotiations will not be deemed written
claims or demands for Data Bank reporting purposes.
In sum, there appears to be no persuasive argument that a pre-suit notice
of intent to file a claim should, itself, be treated as a written claim or demand
for purposes of Data Bank reporting.
Plain language suggests that such notices are not themselves a demand
for payment, but rather are simply a written note indicating that a demand for
payment may--or may not-be forthcoming. Indeed, the notice itself does
not demand payment of any kind. It simply outlines some features of the
demand that might or might not eventually be made, thereby permitting
the mediation for damages arising out of the mediation; or (c) Statements,
memoranda, materials and other tangible evidence, otherwise subject to discovery,
that were not prepared specifically for use in and actually used in the mediation.
155 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. RULES N.D.CA., ADR L.R. 6-12:
(a) Confidential Treatment. Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this local rule,
this court, the mediator, all counsel and parties, and any other persons attending the
mediation shall treat as "confidential information" the contents of the written
Mediation Statements, anything that happened or was said, any position taken, and
any view of the merits of the case expressed by any participant in connection with
any mediation. "Confidential information" shall not be: (1) disclosed to anyone not
involved in the litigation; (2) disclosed to the assigned judge; or (3) used for any
purpose, including impeachment, in any pending or future proceeding in this court.
156 42 U.S.C. § 11151(7) (2006).
157 45 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2010).
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parties a relatively detailed picture of the issues they may wish to resolve
early.
Finally, the whole point of these statutes is substantially defeated if the
early resolution they seek to achieve is thwarted by a mistaken belief that
pre-suit monetary exchanges must be reported to the Data Bank as though
they were in settlement of an actual written demand for payment. The
physicians whose participation is essential will be largely chilled. Even more
importantly, nonmonetary goals such as explanation, reconciliation and
safety improvement that can be addressed through early, nonlitigious
communication 1 8 will likewise be largely thwarted.
D. Caveats: Dismissal, Abatement, and Voluntary Nonsuit
If the foregoing arguments are correct, namely that medical malpractice
insurers should not report settlement payments made during the pre-suit
notification period, several situations require special attention. When a
plaintiff files suit without providing the required pre-suit notice, the court has
a choice. It can dismiss the suit, with or without prejudice, or it can abate the
claim and require that parties simply wait out the pre-suit period before
proceeding with litigation. The plaintiff has an additional choice: Take a
voluntary non-suit, which may or may not be followed by a proper pre-suit
notice and a subsequent filed claim. Plaintiffs also can voluntarily non-suit
even a properly noticed suit.
Courts differ considerably in addressing violations of pre-suit notice
requirements. Texas, for instance, grants abatement on the ground that
outright dismissal is too harsh a consequence:
[A]llowing tolling when a plaintiff sends notice without the authorization
form gives the health care provider fair warning of an imminent claim and
then allows the provider to obtain an abatement for negotiations and
evaluation of the claim. We will not read an overly strict and unfounded
requirement into section 74.051 when the plain language of the statute
provides us with an unambiguous and reasonable meaning.159
If a court thus opts for abatement and permits a prematurely filed
malpractice claim to continue to exist, simply postponing its effectiveness,
then plain language suggests there is a "written claim or demand for
payment" on the table, and that any settlement reached during the time of
153
158 See supra Part I.
159 Hill, 247 S.W.3d at 360. See also Schepps, 652 S.W.2d at 938.
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abatement must be reported to the Data Bank. That is, because the plaintiff
has filed a bona fide malpractice suit and the court is merely delaying
litigation activity for the required sixty days, any settlement would arguably
count as payment in response to that demand.
In contrast, many other states dismiss an inappropriately filed claim. The
Florida Court of Appeal expressly rejected abatement, holding that "we
cannot simply abate what is, for all intents and purposes, a nonexistent
lawsuit." 60 Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that a suit filed
without proper pre-suit notification is "not lawfully filed, and it is of no legal
effect."161 In these cases the courts make clear that no filed claim exists.
More recently a Tennessee Court of Appeal followed suit. 162 The
plaintiff had filed suit in 2005, prior to the enactment of that state's pre-suit
notification statute. She voluntarily nonsuited in February 2009, then re-filed
her claim just under a year later, within the state's one-year savings
statute. 163 However, because the plaintiff failed to comply with the pre-suit
notice state's and certificate of merit requirements in re-filing, her complaint
was dismissed on the ground that it was a "new action" subject to those
requirements.164 Other courts provide similar analyses.165
In these cases plain language would suggest that, where a court has
declared that no claim exists, if parties settle before any genuine malpractice
claim is on the table, the monetary payment will not be reportable. After all,
160 Pearlstein, 500 So. 2d at 587.
161 Thomas, 999 So. 2d at 846.
162 Cude v. Herren, No. W2010-01425-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. September 26,
2011).
163 Id. at *2.
164 Id. at *5.
165 See, e.g., Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 933 So. 2d 927, 929 (Miss. 2006) (noting
plaintiffs failure to send notice at any time "is an inexcusable deviation from the
Legislature's requirements for process and notice under Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36(15),
and such failure warrants dismissal of her claim."); South Miami Hosp. v. Perez, 38 So.
3d 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) ("Because the respondent's claim is essentially a
medical negligence action, she was required to comply with the pre-suit notice and other
requirements of chapter 766, Florida Statutes. Having failed to do so, the amended
complaint should have been dismissed."); Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 575 N.W.2d at 75
("This Court must follow the rule of law established by a prior published decision of this
Court. MCR 7.215(H). Thus, in light of Morrison, we conclude that we are required to
hold that dismissal without prejudice was the appropriate remedy for plaintiffs
noncompliance with § 2912b(l) in this case."). See also Bush v. Shabahang, 772 N.W.2d
272 (Mich. 2009) (dismissing case, but without prejudice); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v.
Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446, 449 (Fla. 1990) (dismissal with leave to amend).
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although an "entity" is paying, it is not paying to settle a "medical
malpractice action or claim."l 66 There is no claim before the court once it is
dismissed and declared to have been a nonentity all along. Also of note,
decisions such as this one lend further credence to the argument, in Part lIIC,
that during the pre-suit notification period, no "written claim or demand"
exists that could be deemed to trigger any mandate that an insurer to report to
the NPDB.
Arguably a similar response applies to a plaintiffs voluntary nonsuit,
and to a dismissal with leave to amend and re-file. The Supreme Court of
Florida, for instance, permits re-filing:
We therefore hold that, in medical malpractice actions, if a pre-suit notice is
served at the same time as a complaint is filed, the complaint is subject to
dismissal with leave to amend. The plaintiff may subsequently file an
amended complaint asserting compliance with the pre-suit notice and
screening requirements of section 768.57 and the pre-suit investigation and
certification requirements of section 768.495(1). We note, however, that
counsel for the defendants will be entitled to fees and costs resulting from
the premature filing of the lawsuit, and such fees could be assessed against
the plaintiff. Further, willful noncompliance with the pre-suit screening
process can still result in dismissal of claims or defenses, as provided in
section 768.57(3)(a). 167
Here, as just above, so long as the suit does not currently exist, then even
if it might reappear at some point in the future, any payment made during the
interim period is arguably not a payment made to settle a written claim or
demand. During that period there simply is no written claim or demand.
166 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (2006).
167 Hosp. Corp. of Am., 571 So. 2d at 449. See also Davis v. Mound View Health
Care, Inc., 640 S.E.2d 91, 95-96 (W. Va. 2006) ("[tlhe Rules do not specifically provide
such a presumption where an action is involuntarily dismissed upon a defendant's motion
for a plaintiffs failure to comply with statutory pre-filing notice requirements. The
specification as to whether a dismissal is with or without prejudice is significant. Where a
dismissal is without prejudice, our savings statute, W. VA. CODE § 55-2-18 may be
utilized to permit the re-filing of a medical malpractice action involuntarily dismissed for
failure to comply with the mandates of W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6 because such dismissal
would not be a dismissal on the merits.") (emphasis omitted).
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IV. MORAL HAZARD
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then medical malpractice insurers and
other such entities should refrain from reporting payments under a variety of
circumstances:
* when a practitioner pays out of pocket;
* when the practitioner forgives or repays the patient's debt;
* when a claim or demand for payment is made orally rather than in
writing;
* when the physician voluntarily (though not in writing) discloses that
s/he erred and offers the patient compensation;
* when a hospital or other organization pays and an individual
practitioner's name is dropped from the suit (corporate shield);
* when parties have agreed, or statutes require, that mediation take
place before any written complaint may be filed, and the settlement
occurs during such mediation; and
* during the pre-suit notification period many states require, including
when a court has determined that a prematurely filed complaint has
been dismissed and not merely abated.
These conclusions may leave some readers unsettled. Isn't the purpose of
the NPDB to keep tabs on incompetent practitioners and, in the process,
protect the public from harm? Is it really a "victory" to protect such providers
from having their mistakes duly recorded and potentially used as a basis for
limiting the damage they can do to the next patient? Indeed, as DHHS has
pondered aloud, doesn't the "corporate shield" (and by implication, other
ways of avoiding NPDB reports) potentially "mask the extent of substandard
care and diminish NPDB's usefulness as a flagging system?"1 68
No. For a variety of reasons, these "moral hazard" concerns should not
keep us from trying to resolve adverse events early, and to recognize that in
many instances such settlement payments need not and should not be
reported to the Data Bank. Briefly, these reasons are that (a) Data Bank
reporting deters rather than enhances quality improvement; (b) the quality
and reliability of NPDB malpractice data are seriously deficient and, indeed,
the mandate to report is essentially unenforceable; (c) HCQIA's assumption
that hospital credentialing processes are the optimal locale for monitoring
168 "The NPDB serves primarily as an alert or flagging system intended to facilitate
a comprehensive review of health care practitioners' professional credentials." NPDB
2007-2009 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 8. NPDB 2005 Annual Report, supra note
115, at 30; NPDB 2006 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 34.
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physicians has now become archaic; and (d) emerging alternative avenues for
monitoring physician quality are greatly superior to the HCQIA's outdated
approach. As a reminder, these arguments are aimed exclusively at the Data
Bank's medical malpractice reportsl 69-not at its reports of sanctions undertaken
by states' medical boardso7 0 or its reports by hospitals and related entities
regarding adverse professional review actions. 171
A. Quality Improvement
First and foremost, if the discussion in Part I is correct, litigation is
powerfully antithetical to improving the quality and safety of patient care, in
large part because it discourages communication that is essential to
identifying and exploring the underlying problems that need to be fixed. To
the extent that the Data Bank encourages physicians to continue litigating
rather than to seek an early and multi-faceted resolution, 172 it directly
threatens important avenues of communication and quality improvement that
are well-recognized today, but little-known back in 1986 when HCQIA was
enacted.
Such a result would contravene the very purpose of the law that created
the NPDB. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act was enacted amidst
express Congressional findings, such as: "The increasing occurrence of
medical malpractice and the need to improve the quality of medical care have
become nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can
be undertaken by any individual State." 73
Congress chose hospital peer review, fueled by Data Bank information,
as its preferred mechanism for improving quality by "restrict[ing] the ability
of incompetent physicians to move from State to State without disclosure or
discovery of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent
performance."l 74 Thus, Congress' overriding emphasis in the Act was to
improve the quality of health care. If hospital peer review was the most
effective vehicle at that time-and quite possibly it was-this is no longer
169 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2006).
170 42 U.S.C. § 11132 (2006).
171 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (2006).
172 As noted above, physicians became less willing to settle cases shortly after the
NPDB became fully operational, expressly because of Data Bank concerns. See Waters et
al., supra note 64, at 290; Smarr, supra note 64; see also Mello & Gallagher, supra note
64.
173 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (2006).
174 Id. at § 11101(2).
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true today, as discussed below. For now we may observe that avoiding Data
Bank reports wherever legally permissible appears, in fact, to be more rather
than less consistent with this ultimate Congressional intent.
Indeed, further evidence of this evolution emerges in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.175 The Act authorized the
Secretary of DHHS to award grants "for the development, implementation,
and evaluation of alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes
over injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care
organizations."l 76 Applicants for these grants were asked to show how their
proposal, inter alia:
(A) makes the medical liability system more reliable by increasing the
availability ofprompt and fair resolution of disputes;
(B) encourages the efficient resolution of disputes;
(C) encourages the disclosure of health care errors;
(D) enhances patient safety by detecting, analyzing, and helping to reduce
medical errors and adverse events. 17 7
To the extent that the NPDB chills physicians' willingness to participate
in such alternatives, it appears to be in direct conflict with Congress' current
intent.
B. Degradation of NPDB Data and its Utility: Garbage In,
Garbage Out
For a wide variety of reasons, information in the malpractice portion of
the Data Bank should not be deemed a reliable indication of whether or how
often a practitioner has committed malpractice-i.e., whether he is an
"incompetent physician" as contemplated by the statute. 178 DHHS expressly
recognizes that a Data Bank report does not necessarily betoken
malpractice. 179 Unfortunately, the limits of Data Bank integrity and
175 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (to be codified as amended at scattered sections of the Internal Revenue
Code and in 42 U.S.C.).
176 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2006).
177 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
178 Id.
179
The NPDB acts primarily as a flagging system; its principal purpose is to facilitate a
comprehensive review of professional credentials. Information on medical
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completeness are considerably worse than DHHS may recognize. Arguably
its medical malpractice entries are no longer useful even as a flagging
system.
1. Medical Malpractice Reports Do Not Capture Malpractice
Well
As discussed in Part I, studies reveal that there is very little connection
between negligent iatrogenesis and a filed medical malpractice claim: Most
negligence does not result in a claim, and most claims are not linked with
negligence. 80 In other cases physicians may deem it appropriate to compensate
patients for adverse outcomes that are clearly not negligent.
For example, it is not uncommon for anesthesiologists or certified registered
nurse anesthetists to dislodge a tooth or filling during intubation or
extubation. This is often caused by the poor condition of the patient's
dentitia, and can result in a small settlement to compensate the patient for
damage or replacement, which must be reported to the NPDB.181
2. Medical Malpractice Reports Appear Significantly Late
Whereas an early settlement would appear virtually immediately in the
Data Bank, a litigated medical malpractice resolution takes far longer.
malpractice payments, certain adverse licensure actions, adverse clinical privilege
actions, adverse professional society membership actions and Medicare/Medicaid
exclusions is collected from and disseminated to eligible entities.
NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 77, at E- 1.
"The Secretary of HHS understands that some medical malpractice claims
(particularly those referred to as nuisance claims) may be settled for convenience, not as
a reflection on the professional competence or professional conduct of a practitioner." Id
at E-9.
"A payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be
construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred." 45 C.F.R. §
60.7(d) (2010).
180 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also Brennan, supra note 3; Dauer
& Marcus, supra note 1, at 190; Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851,
1851 (1994); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence, Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III,
325 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 245, 245-51 (1991); Yee, supra note 3, at 423-24 (physicians
make more errors during immediate period after being sued).
181 Smarr, supra note 64, at 69.
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According to the DHHS annual NPDB reports, the average duration from the
time an incident occurs to the time a payment is made is over four and a half
years, and in some states nearly eight years. 182 By the time a payment
appears in the Data Bank it is seriously out of date. Even if a report were
indicative of malpractice at the time of the incident, it does not follow that
the physician is still "incompetent" years later. Its value as an alert to peer
reviewers is thus considerably attenuated.
A second problem is that, as noted, the physician is encouraged to
litigate. The longer he hangs on, the longer it takes to reach a resolution and
thereafter to see a Data Bank report. And because physicians prevail so much
of the time when they litigate instead of mediate, the odds are limited that
any report will be made at all-even where the physician's care truly was
negligent.
3. Underreporting, Unenforceability
In theory, entities such as medical malpractice insurers have a significant
incentive to report to the Data Bank each time they pay a settlement or
judgment on behalf of a practitioner. After all, failure means a potential
penalty of $11,000 per instance. In reality, however, significant
underreporting is almost certainly occurring. In 2000 the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) found high levels of errors among all reports
(malpractice, peer review, and licensure actions).18 3 Specifically regarding
medical malpractice reports the GAO observed that, although the Health
Services Resource Administration (HRSA):
has been concerned that malpractice payments are underreported, it has not
been able to determine the magnitude of the problem despite many years of
effort. Medical malpractice payments can be underreported in two ways,
182 Per the NPDB 2005 Annual Report the average duration was 4.66 years, up
eighteen days from 2004. The delay varied among states, from 3.20 years in Oregon to
6.16 years in Massachusetts. NPDB 2005 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 8. Per the
next year's report: "[D]uring 2006 payments were made most quickly in South Dakota (a
mean payment delay of 3.26 years) and California (3.30 years). Payments were slowest in
Alaska (7.83 years) and Massachusetts (6.60 years)." NPDB 2006 Annual Report, supra
note 115, at 33. The most recent NPDB Annual Report does not update these figures. See
NPDB 2007-2009 Annual Report, supra note 115. See also Smarr, supra note 64, at 71-
72 (noting nearly five-year lag means NPDB fails to provide timely information).
183 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: MAJOR
IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK's RELIABILITY GAO-01-130, at 5,
10-13 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01130.pdf.
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neither of which has been successfully quantified. First, agency officials
believe that some insurers may be using a technicality in NPDB's reporting
requirements to avoid reporting some practitioners. Second, agency officials
believe that some insurers and self-insured organizations such as HMOs and
other health plans should report to NPDB but do not.184
The report then makes a crucial point: "HRSA has not yet identified or
fined any organizations for failing to report the required information. Agency
officials told us that they are reluctant to impose fines because they believe
that the cost of levying and collecting civil penalties often exceeds the
$11,000 maximum amount that can be assessed."' 85
A major part of the problem is that there is apparently no reliable way for
HRSA to track whether and when insurers actually make malpractice
payments in the first place, to be able to match those with Data Bank reports.
In one effort to track down discrepancies between payments and reports,
HRSA used malpractice claims data that insurance companies voluntarily
reported to an umbrella organization, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC).1 86 However, any Data Bank report verification done
via comparisons with the NAIC data base is of limited value, since reports to
that organization are completely voluntary. Insurers who wish to avoid being
caught for failure to make NPDB reports need only to refrain from making
voluntary reports to the NAIC, and there will be no discrepancy for HRSA to
observe.
Of interest, the most recent NPDB Annual Report does little to address
this issue. Although it states that compliance activities were enhanced for
2007, 2008, and 2009, these activities were directed toward such entities as
"the DEA, Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCU), the National Council of
184 Id. at 10.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 12.
[HRSA] identified 41 insurers that reported payments to NAIC but not to NPDB.
HRSA contacted these companies seeking explanations regarding the differences in
the reported payments. As of September 2000, 17 of the 41 companies have
adequately explained the discrepancies to HRSA. For instance, NAIC data, for some
companies, reflect total payments made by their corporations-combining payments
made on behalf of individual practitioners with payments made on behalf of
organizations. NPDB data only represent payments made on behalf of individual
practitioners. Of the remaining 24 companies, 18 recognized their omissions and
agreed to file the delinquent reports. The other six companies have not responded to
HRSA's inquiries and have been warned by the agency that they will be reported to
HHS/OIG for possible enforcement action.
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State Boards of Nursing, the Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards,
and the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy."187 The Report asserts
that compliance was monitored and that the Division of Practitioner Data
Bank "ensured that medical malpractice and adverse actions were being
reported to the NPDB."1 88 However, there is no indication just how such
reports were being ensured. The closest information on point indicates only
that, regarding hospitals' mandate to report adverse actions regarding
practitioners' privileges, many hospitals have never reported anything
whatever to the NPDB.1 89 Hence, it is not clear just what sort of ramped-up
enforcement is being described in this latest NPDB Annual Report.
In sum, it appears that there is little way for HRSA to figure out whether
insurers are actually reporting as required. Because the cost of enforcement
exceeds the value of the penalty assessed against the insurer, HRSA has little
incentive to enforce the mandate even where it detects violations.
The NPDB's mandate to report malpractice payments thus appears
unenforceable.
This essentially inevitable underreporting presents obvious problems.
First, if the goal of the Data Bank is to alert hospital peer review entities to
physicians who may be poor practitioners, this obviously can not happen
where a report is never made. Second, significant underreporting will
inappropriately stigmatize those physicians who actually land in the Data
Bank, if in fact a significant number of other physicians with comparable
medical malpractice records are never reported.
It might be replied that HCQIA requires that any malpractice report
made to the Data Bank must also be forwarded to state licensing boards,190
and that many states require malpractice payments to be directly reported to
state licensure boards.191 Although true, the actual consequences of these
187 See NPDB 2007-2009 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 19, 24, 29, 35.
188 Id. at 20.
189 Id. at 72-73.
190 42 U.S.C. § 11 134(c)(1), (2) (2006).
191 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 456.049 (2007) (requiring practitioners to report claims or
actions for damages to the Office of Insurance Refulation); FLA. STAT. § 456.041(4)
(2007) (requiring reports of payments exceeding $100,000 to the Department of Health);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-310(1), (2) (WEST 2008) (requiring reports of malpractice
claims settled or finally adjudicated to be made to the commissioner of insurance, who
must forward the information to the appropriate licensing board); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.224(D) (WEST 2008) (requiring that any professional liability insurer notify the
state medical board of any settlement or payment exceeding $25,000); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2836(x) (2008) (permitting license revocation for any physician or other licensee
who has "failed to report to the board any adverse judgment, settlement or award against
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reports appear to be considerably less significant than reports in the Data
Bank. Some state-mandated reports are purely for informational purposes.192
Also, state medical boards do not often impose sanctions simply because a
physician has paid for purported malpractice. Rather, license restrictions on
the whole are relatively rare and are more likely to follow offenses such as
unprofessional conduct, sexual misconduct, misprescribing of controlled
substances, or similarly salient problems.193 In 2002, negligence accounted
for less than 15% of state boards' disciplinary actions. The most common
resolution, in two-thirds of cases, was a private agreement in which the
physician was not found guilty of the alleged offense.194 More importantly, if
state boards' reporting requirements were to deter physicians from early
resolution in the same way as the NPDB, they should arguably be
reshaped.195
the licensee resulting from a medical malpractice liability claim . . ."); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 10-1-120 (2010) (requiring each medical malpractice insurer to send information to the
state medical board regarding each medical malpractice claim for which a settlement or
judgment has been paid); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-103 (1975) (physicians must notify
the medical board of each medical malpractice claim).
192 FLA. STAT. § 456.041(4) (2007) (requiring reports to the Department of Health of
payments exceeding $100,000).
193 See, e.g., Lena H. Sun, State Boards Don't Always Discipline Doctors
Sanctioned by Hospitals, WASH. POST, March 16, 2011, 12:27 a.m.,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/03/16/AR2011031605966.h
tml; Alan Levine et al., State Medical Boards Fail to Discipline Doctors with Hospital
Actions Against Them, PUBLIC CITIZEN, March 15, 2011, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/1937.pdf (noting that nearly half of physicians
disciplined by hospitals had escaped any licensure action, and that the most common
categories of failure to take licensure action included physicians who posed an immediate
threat to health or safety, were incompetent or negligent, provided substandard care, or
who engaged in sexual misconduct, fraud or narcotics violations).
194 Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and Recidivism: An Evaluation of
Physician Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 867, 874
(2007). See also Sidney M. Wolfe et al., Public Citizen's Health Research Group
Ranking of State Medical Boards' Serious Disciplinary Actions: 2007-2009, PUBLIC
CITIZEN, April 5, 2010, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/1905.pdf, Sidney
M. Wolfe & Kate Resnevic, Public Citizen's Health Research Group Ranking of State
Medical Boards' Serious Disciplinary Actions: 2006-2008, PUBLIC CITIZEN, April 20,
2009, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/HRGl 868.pdf.
195 Some states also place malpractice information in public view:
According to a recent review, thirty-two states post physician profiles on the Intemet
for use by consumers. While most sites contain discipline and license data, many
states also include physician-specific information on medical malpractice
judgments, with a handful disclosing malpractice settlements as well. Rhode Island
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4. Imbalanced Reporting: Consent-to-Settle Clauses
A key assumption behind the NPDB is that a payment made to settle a
malpractice claim implies that the physician must have erred in some way, at
least in most cases. This assumption arises partly from the fact that many
physicians' malpractice insurance contracts feature a "consent to settle"
clause, that is, a clause permitting the physician to veto any effort to settle
the case without her permission. If the physician believes he has not erred, he
can defend himself as long as the courts permit, and in most cases will win
the case.
This assumption is inapplicable, however, for physicians whose policies
lack such a clause. 196 In these cases a settlement can reflect, not any
evaluation that the physician erred, but simply a business judgment that it is
less costly to settle than fight. Indeed, the state of Florida directly forbids
such clauses. Per Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.4147(b)(1):
It is against public policy for any insurance or self-insurance policy to
contain a clause giving the insured the exclusive right to veto any offer for
admission of liability and for arbitration made pursuant to s. 766.106,
settlement offer, or offer of judgment, when such offer is within the policy
limits. However, any offer of admission of liability, settlement offer, or
offer of judgment made by an insurer or self-insurer shall be made in good
faith and in the best interests of the insured.197
Of note, Florida courts have been reluctant to consider that the
physician's professional reputation or the potentially adverse implications of
a Data Bank report will count as that physician's "best interests" under this
statute. Per a Florida appellate court, "[t]he 'best interests of the insured,'
within meaning of statute . . . means the interests of the insured's rights under
the malpractice policy, not some collateral effect unconnected with the
and Florida have online report card systems that exclude liability suit information.
Massachusetts and New York have systems that include a summary of doctors'
liability histories, including selected information on malpractice settlements.
California recently approved the creation of a system that would disclose settlement
information for repeat offenders.
Sage et al., supra note 3, at 1288 (citations omitted).
196 Id. See also Smarr, supra note 64, at 60-70.
197 But see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1306 (forbidding insurers from entering
into settlement exceeding $3000 without the written consent of the insured).
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claim." 98 Similarly, in Freeman v. Cohenl99 the appellate court agreed with
the insurer that "[t]he policy's purpose was indemnification and a defense of
covered claims, not to protect the insured from increases in insurance
premiums or damage to his reputation from a paid claim." 200
Nationwide, a number of medical malpractice policies lack a consent-to-
settle clause, thereby permitting purely business-based settlement
decisions.201 As it is not clear what proportions of physicians have versus
lack such a clause, likewise we do not know what portion of malpractice
reports in the Data Bank are the product of business expediency decisions in
response to unfiltered allegations, and what portion reflect genuine
malpractice. The government's simple caveat that "[a] payment in settlement
of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be construed as creating a
presumption that medical malpractice has occurred" 202 is not particularly
helpful.
5. Imbalanced Reporting: Government Physicians
The problem of wide variation in the quality of Data Bank information is
exacerbated when we add government-employed physicians. When someone
is allegedly injured by the acts of a federal employee, the Federal Tort
Claims Act 203 is implicated rather than state law, and the plaintiff generally
sues the federal government rather than the particular government employees
involved. Accordingly, HCQIA required the Secretary of DHHS to explore
how the statute would apply to government-employed health care
198 Rogers v. Chicago Ins. Co., 964 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). In
Rogers, the insurer had ninety days to investigate the claim, but did not begin to do so
until the deadline was nearly expired. The insurer opted to settle the case instead of fight.
The Florida Court of Appeal upheld the insurer's right to settle, denying the physician's
claim that settling exhibited bad faith. See also Robert Rubin, Legal, Practical, and
Ethical Considerations of Medical Malpractice Settlements, 83 FLA. BAR J. 47 (2009).
199 Freeman v. Cohen, 969 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
200 Id. at 1155. See also Thomas E. Dukes & Helen V. Owens, Settlements and
Releases in Malpractice Claims, in FLORIDA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE HANDBOOK MALP
FL-CLE 16-1 (2006).
201 See, e.g., Teague v. St. Paul Fire and Marine, 974 So. 2d 1266, 1269 (La. 2008);
Rohart v. Melsar Risk Mgmt. Servs., 2009 WL 5068585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Brief
for Appellant, Shega v. Lewis, 1999 WL 33895195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (although
insured physician had a consent-to-settle clause, the insurer settled without informing
insured physician and thus without insured's express consent).
202 45 C.F.R. § 60.7(d) (2010).
203 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2006).
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practitioners, then enter into memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the
Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, and the
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 204
The MOUs that emerged created a peer review process to function as an
intermediary between a medical malpractice payment and a Data Bank
report. 205 They thereby created very different standards for reporting
government physicians, than for ordinary physicians.206 Military physicians,
for instance, can only be reported if several layers of senior evaluation,
including the respective military branch's Surgeon General, determine that
the physician actually committed malpractice, and further that this caused the
plaintiffs injury. The military review system thus can decline to report to the
NPDB, even when a court has found the physician at fault for malpractice. 207
204 42 U.S.C. § 11 152(b)-(c) (2006); see also NPDB 2007-2009 Annual Report at
10.
205 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: MAJOR
IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK'S RELIABILITY GAO-01-130, at
12 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO1130.pdf.
206 Per the NPDB 2006 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 17-18, 34:
The Secretary signed an MOU with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
September 21, 1987, with the DEA on November 4, 1988 (revised on June 19,
2003), and with the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) November 19, 1990.
In addition, MOUs with the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard
and with the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons were signed June 6,
1994 and August 21, 1994, respectively. Policies under which the Public Health
Service participates in the NPDB were implemented November 9, 1989 and October
15, 1990.
207 The process is elaborate:
The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) policy requires malpractice payments to
be reported to the NPDB only if the practitioner was responsible for an act or
omission that was the cause (or a major contributing cause) of the harm that gave
rise to the payment. Also, it is reported only if at least one of the following
circumstances exists about the act or omission: (1) The Surgeon General of the
affected military department (Air Force, Army, or Navy) determines that the
practitioner deviated from the standard of care; (2) The payment was the result of a
judicial determination of negligence and the Surgeon General finds that the court's
determination was clearly based on the act or omission; and (3) The payment was
the result of an administrative or litigation settlement and the Surgeon General finds
that based on the case's record as whole, the purpose of the NPDB requires that a
report be made. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) uses a similar
process when deciding whether to report malpractice payments.
NPDB 2006 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 34. See also Veterans Health
Admin., Dep't of Veterans Affairs, VHA HANDBOOK 1100.17, 6, 11, NAT'L
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This standard is completely different from that to which ordinary
physicians are held. For an ordinary physician, an insurer's simple business
decision can be sufficient to leave a black mark in the NPDB, as will a court
judgment that reflects, not scientific evidence, but only jury emotion.
Matters are only marginally different in the case of physicians employed
by DHHS, as for instance those working for the National Institutes of Health
or the Indian Health Service. In principle, "all settled or adjudicated HHS
medical malpractice cases must be reported to the NPDB. This policy applies
to all cases regardless of whether the standard of care has been met."208
However, DHHS can make an exception and decline to report "those
cases in which the adverse event was caused by system error." 209 This
exception appears eminently sensible, if the Data Bank's goal is to identify
incompetent practitioners. After all, if the individual's error was mainly the
product of far broader, system-level error(s), then it seems unfair to tag the
individual physician as though he or she were primarily responsible for the
outcome.
The implication, however, is that this caveat could effectively exclude
nearly all the Data Bank reports that would otherwise be required. As
observed in Part I, two decades' systems-level research into adverse medical
outcomes has made it clear that rarely is an adverse outcome simply the
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK (NPDB) REPORTS, December 28, 2009, available at
http://wwwl.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ID=2135:
(c) Reporting to the NPDB is based on the finding by a Review Panel that there
was substandard care, professional incompetence, or professional misconduct during
an episode of care ....
(d) For each involved practitioner, the Medical Center Director's notification
must state that the request for a statement does not imply blame or fault, but, rather,
is the practitioner's opportunity to submit information for consideration by the
Review Panel... .
(i). Submission of NPDB Reports. (1) Payment will be considered to have been
made for the benefit of a physician, dentist, or other licensed health care practitioner
when the Director, Office of Medical-Legal Affairs, notifies, per subparagraph
8h(l), the Medical Center Director that the conclusion (of at least a majority) of the
Review Panel is that payment was related to substandard care, professional
incompetence, or professional misconduct on the part of the physician, dentist, or
other licensed health care practitioner. In any case where professional incompetence
or professional misconduct is involved, coordination with other relevant processes
should occur (e.g., Professional Standards Board, Disciplinary Appeals Board, or
administrative investigations). ...
See also 38 C.F.R. § 46.3(b) (2010) ("malpractice payment reporting").
208 NPDB 2006 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 17-18.
209 Id. at 18.
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product of a single practitioner's carelessness. 210 Thus, where an NIH
physician can show that system-level flaws either caused or significantly
contributed to the adverse outcome, he need not be reported. Under otherwise
identical circumstances, non-government physicians would be reported,
because no such exception applies to them.
Perhaps not surprisingly, DHHS rarely reports its physicians to the Data
Bank. In the first fifteen years of NPDB operation, DHHS agencies reported
only 257 medical malpractice cases.211 By 2006, after a concerted effort to
increase reporting, the sixteen-year total rose to 574, 30% of which were
reported in 2006.212
6. Imbalanced Reporting: Sovereign Immunity and Charitable
Immunity
Somewhat analogously, many states permit physicians who provide
charity care or who work for the state to be shielded from malpractice
liability via charitable or sovereign immunity, respectively.213 The state of
Arkansas, for instance, provides that physicians who are retired but still
licensed, and who render uncompensated or low-cost medical services at
designated clinics "shall not be liable for any civil damages for any act or
omission resulting from the rendering of such medical services, unless the act
or omission was the result of such licensee's gross negligence or willful
misconduct."214
210 See Part I's discussion of the Root Cause Analysis undertaken after the death of
a sixteen-year-old obstetric patient caused by a medication error. What ostensibly
appeared to be simple carelessness on the part of the nurse turned out, on closer analysis,
to be the product of multiple layers of system-level problems. See Smetzer et al., supra
note 19. See also Dekker, supra note 21; Leape, supra note 21; Denham, supra note 21.
211 NPDB 2005 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 15.
212 NPDB 2006 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 18. These numbers were not
updated in the most recent report. See NPDB 2007-2009 Annual Report.
213 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-13-3 (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51 § 152,
152-1, 152.2 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-
29.1(a)(1) (2011); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.003. See generally Carol A.
Crocca, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory Provisions
Limiting Amount ofRecovery in Medical Malpractice Claims, 26 A.L.R. 5th 245 (1995).
214 ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-106 (2010). See also ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.300
(2010); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-571 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8135 (1999); D.C.
CODE § 7-402 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-195.1 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
7703 (2011); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/31 (2006); IND. CODE § 34-30-13-1 (2010); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS, 333.16277 (2008); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-71 (2008); NEB. REv. STAT. §
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Clearly, a physician who has charitable or sovereign immunity will not
incur a Data Bank report under circumstances in which another physician,
not similarly immunized, would be susceptible to a suit and a report.
7. Data Bank Reports can Cause Physicians Harm
As discussed in Part IIA, Data Bank reports can cause physicians real
harm. One report can potentially cause a cascade of further consequences in
which each successive institution sees the prior report(s), then circumscribes
or revokes the physician's credentials, which in turn requires another Data
Bank report that, in turn, can trigger additional adverse consequences for the
physician's prerogatives to practice.215 Such harms may be unintended where
they befall physicians who are high-quality rather than the "incompetent"
practitioners targeted by the act. But the effects are nonetheless real and,
where they limit the practice of good physicians, they diminish rather than
enhance quality of care-quite the reverse of Congress's intent.
8. Medical Malpractice Reports Largely Superfluous
Just as the Data Bank's medical malpractice reports are not particularly
informative, evidence also suggests that they may also be superfluous. The
federal government and a federal appellate court have both acknowledged
that, even if a physician's malpractice payment is not listed in the Data Bank,
that physician is likely to show up elsewhere in the Data Bank if he or she is
a genuinely problematic practitioner. Thus, DHHS observes that
"[p]hysicians with high numbers of Malpractice Payment Reports tended to
have at least some Adverse Action Reports [licensure and/or clinical
privilege reports] and Medicare/Medicaid Exclusion Reports, and vice
versa." 216 Indeed, per a GAO report to Congress, "[i]ndustry
experts ... point[] out that disciplinary actions taken by health care providers
25-21,188.02 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.16 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
03.1-02.2 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.234 (2004); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 76, § 32
(2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-50 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-708 (2009); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-13-3 (1953) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.300 (2005); W. VA.
CODE § 30-3-l0a (2011); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-129 (1977).
215 See Chudacoff 609 F. Supp.2d at 1166; Doe v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., 221 P.3d at 661;
Cole, 199 P.3d at 815.
216 NPDB 2005 Annual Report, supra note 115, at 37-38. See also NPDB 2006
Annual Report, supra note 115, at 41.
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and states are better indicators of professional competence than medical
malpractice." 217
Similarly, in Am. Dental Ass'n v. Shalala, the D.C. Circuit Court
expressly acknowledged that, even where a malpractice payment does not
appear in the Data Bank because the practitioner pays out of pocket, "those
claims ... will be reported if they come to the attention of an entity such as a
peer review board." 218 As the court then concluded, permitting self-paying
practitioners to avoid a malpractice report to the Data Bank "does not
fundamentally undermine the Act."219
C. Hospital Peer Review: Evolution into Anachronism
The HCQIA has itself become increasingly anachronistic. The
anachronism emerges from several assumptions implicit in the statute. First,
back in 1986, Congress, through HCQIA, seemed to presume that adverse
outcomes were largely the product of individual persons and their
carelessness and that if only we can reduce such poor practice, we can
improve the safety and quality of health care. 220 A corollary assumption was
that if we can identify such poor practitioners and discipline them or restrict
their practice, we will have significantly fewer adverse events. Third,
HCQIA assumed that the best locus for identifying such errant individuals
was the hospital and its peer review system. 221
From these assumptions the Act then inferred that if hospital peer review
activities are protected by qualified immunity, and if these committees are
provided with adequate information via the Data Bank, they will be able to
reduce adverse events and thereby improve quality-first, by restricting or
217 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: MAJOR
IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK's RELIABILITY GAO-01-130, at 4
(2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01130.pdf.
218 Shalala, 3 F.3d at 448.
219 Id. Of note, once the Shalala court thus circumscribed the requirement to report
malpractice payments in this way, Congress could have chosen to amend the statute to
require that any payment by an "entity or person" must be reported. Congress chose not
to do so, and that decision cannot be construed as accidental.
220 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (2006).
221 42 U.S.C. § 11101(3) (2006). Although various peer review entities have the
right to engage in peer review and check NPDB data (§ 11133), only hospitals are
required to check the NPDB upon initial credentialing and every two years thereafter.
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removing poorly-performing physicians' opportunities to practice in the
hospital setting and second, by reducing their opportunities to start anew in
another location and perpetuate their errant practices. 222
This picture has become anachronistic in several ways. To begin with,
we now understand that adverse outcomes are largely the product of systems-
level flaws, and are not usually reducible to incompetent individuals' slip-
ups. Individuals do of course err. They become fatigued, distracted, harried,
and hurried. But patient safety systems need to incorporate recognition of
those human inevitabilities rather than simply punish them and admonish
greater attentiveness.
A classic example concerns the anesthesiologist who, during surgery,
reached into a drawer for the agent to reverse a sedated patient's chemical
paralysis. Instead of grabbing the reversal agent, he grabbed the paralytic
agent-clearly, an error. The broader problem was that both vials were side
by side in the same drawer; both had yellow labels; both had yellow caps;
both were the same size and shape. No harm came to the patient in this
instance, but when the anesthesiologist related the incident to his colleagues
he learned that almost universally they, too, had made the same error.223
Contemporary systems-analysis would recognize that amid a busy surgical
setting such incidents are likely to happen. It makes far better sense to
reorganize the drawer and to change the colors and shapes of labels and caps,
than to punish anesthesiologists again and again for being human.
In addition to its outdated assumption that errant individuals should be
the primary target for improving safety and quality, a second anachronism is
HCQIA's reliance on hospital peer review as the key mechanism for catching
such errant individuals. In 1986, nearly all physicians practiced in a hospital
setting at least some of the time. Surgeons, anesthesiologists, and other
invasive specialists had to use hospital-furnished operating rooms,
catheterization labs, and the like. Primary care physicians who spent much of
their day in an office also had to make hospital rounds on any patients who
were hospitalized.
As a result, most physicians needed to have credentials and privileges at
one or more hospitals. As a further result, Congress correctly discerned that
at that time, hospitals had considerable leverage over physicians. Hospitals'
medical staffs could more aggressively weed out poorly performing
physicians if they could feel safe from antitrust and similar litigation, and if
they had comprehensive information about which physicians were showing
222 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (2006).
223 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Do No Harm: Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of
Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at DI.
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poor performance, such as medical malpractice payouts, licensure
restrictions, or adverse credentialing actions at some other hospital. 224 Hence,
Congress provided strong, albeit qualified, immunity for participating in peer
review, 225 created the NPDB to ensure a broad data base, 226 and then
required hospitals-but only hospitals-to check that Data Bank upon initial
credentialing and every two years thereafter. 227
Well into the twenty-first century, however, physicians' relationships
with hospitals have changed dramatically. Many primary care physicians no
longer find it efficient to round on their hospitalized patients, and instead
delegate such duties to hospitalists. 228 At the same time, many specialists
have created free-standing ambulatory centers for surgery, invasive
cardiology, interventionalist radiology, diagnostic and imaging evaluations of
varying types, and numerous other services formerly provided only in a
hospital. For these physicians, too, hospital credentials may not be important.
The net result of this evolution is that many physicians' histories of adverse
professional evaluations, as recorded in the Data Bank, are less and less
likely to come to the attention of anyone likely to see and use that
information.
224 42 U.S.C. § 11 101(3)-(5) (2006).
225 42 U.S.C. § I1111-12 (2006).
226 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11133 (2006).
227 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (2006). Other entities such as state licensing boards and
managed care organizations are permitted to view the data, but only hospitals are required
to view it.
228 The term "hospitalist" was first coined in 1996-ten years after HCQIA was
enacted. Hospitalists oversee the care of patients for the duration of an inpatient stay.
Hospitalists become intimately familiar not just with serious illness, but also with the
mechanics of how to get tests and procedures completed efficiently and with optimal
planning for safe and efficient discharge. The goals include reduced length of stay and
reduced morbidity and mortality. See Robert M. Wachter & Lee Goldman, The Emerging
Role of 'Hospitalists' in the American Health Care System, 335 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 514,
514 (1996). See also Mary Beth Hamel, Jeffrey M. Drazen & Arnold M. Epstein, The
Growth of Hospitalists and the Changing Face of Primary Care, 360 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
1141, 1141-42 (2009); Yong-Fang Kuo, Gulshan Sharma, Jean L. Freeman & James S.
Goodwin, Growth in the Care of Older Patients by Hospitalists in the United States, 360
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1102 (2009); Frustrations With Hospitalist Care: Need to Improve
Transitions and Communication, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 469, 469 (2010); William
N. Southern, Matthew A. Berger, Eran Y. Bellin, Susan M. Hailpern & Julia H. Arnsten,
Hospitalist Care and Length of Stay in Patients Requiring Complex Discharge Planning
and Close Clinical Monitoring, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1869, 1869 (2007).
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D. Superior Approaches to Ensuring Practitioner Competence,
Enhancing Safety
All of this is not to suggest that there is no such thing as an incompetent
physician or that incompetent physicians cannot do harm. Neither is it to say
that incompetent physicians should not be identified and either restricted or
re-educated. It is to say, however, that we now need to identify far more
effective ways of improving the safety and quality of care. We need not just
to monitor practitioners' errors, but more broadly to assess their abilities to
provide high quality care.
In the current economic climate, new structures are emerging that hope
to do both, far better than a crude tally of the times an entity has paid money
on behalf of a physician. As early as the 1990s, major corporations and
business groups began to embrace "value-based purchasing" in the belief that
the enormous sums they spent on health care should produce high-quality
results. They began using their purchasing power to select superior providers,
using various outcome measures. 229
More recently, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has
announced its own value-based purchasing initiative. It will incorporate
clinical process-of-care measures in five health categories, such as heart
failure and pneumonia, to influence its payments to providers. 230 As CMS
notes:
Medicare's current payment systems reward quantity, rather than quality of
care, and provide neither incentive nor support to improve quality of care.
Value-based purchasing (VBP), which links payment more directly to the
quality of care provided, is a strategy that can help to transform the current
payment system by rewarding providers for delivering high quality,
efficient clinical care. Through a number of public reporting programs,
demonstration projects, pilot programs, and voluntary efforts, CMS has
launched VBP initiatives in hospitals, physician offices, nursing homes,
home health services, and dialysis facilities. 231
229 Jack Meyer, Lise Rybowski & Rena Eichler, Theory and Reality of Value-Based
Purchasing: Lessons from the Pioneers, AHRQ/AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH
AND QUALITY, (1997), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/meyerrpt.htm.
230 Cheryl Clark, CMS Releases Value-Based Purchasing Incentive Plan,
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA, (Jan. 11, 2011), available at
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/HEP-26121 1/CMS-Releases-ValueBased-
Purchasing-Incentive-Plan.
231 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED
PURCHASING PLAN DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES PAPER, (Jan. 17, 2007), available at
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In a similar vein, Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) appear likely
to become a significant player in the health care landscape. They will feature
partnerships or networks of hospitals, primary care providers, and others
whose members will share savings achieved if they can reduce costs while
maintaining or improving quality of care for their patient population-
initially described as a Medicare population, but likely to be replicated by
private health plans. 232 These ACOs, in turn, will emphasize that patients
should have a "medical home" in which care is provided by a personal
physician who can coordinate and integrate care with an eye toward serving
the whole person. A medical home must use evidence-based medicine and
continuous quality improvement, and will be financially rewarded for
providing the added value of these sorts of services. 233
In a variation on this theme, bundled payments for major units of service,
such as a surgical procedure or even the care of patients with a chronic
illness like diabetes, provide incentives for physicians, hospitals, and other
providers to work together in ways that demand quality and accountability
from all. 234 Likewise, hospitals are increasingly purchasing physician
practices, both primary care and specialists. 235 Here, the hospital investigates
the physician's practice quality as part of its own due diligence and will
https://www.cms.gov/AcutelnpatientPPS/downloads/hospital VBP jlan-issuesPaper.p
df. See also Brian Betner, Adele Merenstain & Regan Tankersley, Value-Based




BasedPurchasingProgramForlPPSHospitals.aspx; VALUE BASED PURCHASING AND
HEALTH CARE REFORM, available at http://www.valuebasedpurchasing.com/.
232 Mark C. Shields, Jankaj H. Patel, Martin Manning & Lee Sacks, A Model for
Integrating Independent Physicians into Accountable Care Organizations, 30 HEALTH
AFF. 1, 1 (2011); Thomas L. Greaney, Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal,
Accountable Care Organizations-The Fork in the Road, 263 NEW ENGL. J. MED. el
(2011); Patients'Role in Accountable Care Organizations, 363 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2583
(2011); Nat'l Comm. on Quality Assurance, NCQA Patient-Centered Medical Home,
available at
http://www.ncqa.org/Portals/0/Programs/Recognition/2011 PCMHbrochureweb.pdf.
233 Carol Carden & Mark Dietrich, A Valuation Model for the Formation of ACOs,
HEALTH LAWYERS WEEKLY, VOL. 9, Feb. 4, 2011, available at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/News/Health%20Lawyers%2OWeekly/Pages/201 1/Februar
y%20201 1 /February%2004%202011/AValuationModelForTheFormationOfACOs.aspx.
234 Struijs & Baan, supra note 119.
235 Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Ashni, Hospitals' Race to Employ Physicians: The
Logic Behind a Money-Losing Proposition, 364 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1790 (2011).
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customarily require far better quality data than clumsy Data Bank
malpractice reports. They will continue their peer review processes and will,
appropriately, report adverse credentialing actions to the Data Bank.
Hospitals that own physician practices are more free, as are ACOs, to engage
in early dispute resolution and to use the corporate shield to ensure that their
physician employees are not penalized for participating actively in the
process.
A major highlight of these economic developments is that value-seeking
payment systems provide a substantial incentive to physician groups, ACOs,
physician-hospital alliances and other entities to provide high-quality care.
ACOs and kindred organizations must monitor their providers carefully. But
they are not likely to accomplish this by consulting odd malpractice data
from a Data Bank that provides at best a mish-mosh of largely
uninterpretable events. Peer review will continue to be important, but it
should no longer be predominantly seen as a traditional hospital committee
keeping tabs on medical staff. Rather, these broader organizations must
review physicians' day-to-day performance, including that of primary care
physicians who may never admit patients to the hospital, and must likewise
keep tabs on surgeons and proceduralists who may practice exclusively in
ambulatory facilities.
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion suggests that HCQIA's requirement to report medical
malpractice payments to the National Practitioner Data Bank has worked out
rather poorly. Indeed, Sage et al. recommend that malpractice reporting
provisions be deleted entirely 236-a conclusion with which this author does
not disagree.237 "[T]he malpractice reporting portion of the NPDB should be
236 Sage et al., supra note 3, at 1264, 1300, 1307 ("[o]verall, however, it is likely
that patients would be better off if the malpractice reporting provisions of the NPDB were
repealed, not least because NPDB information appears to be of limited utility for
purposes of rating physician quality.").
237 Indeed, in as Congress contemplated whether to include malpractice reports in
the NPDB, it recognized the limited quality of such data.
With all of it faults, the malpractice system has been the primary approach that
aggrieved patients have taken to deal with inadequate medical care. Accordingly,
malpractice data can provide important clues for evaluating the credentials of health
care practitioners. ... [T]he Committee is well aware that malpractice data provide
only clues, not conclusions. Any number of considerations other than the merits of a
claim can affect the size and frequency of malpractice payments. The sympathy
generated by the severity of an injury, the attractiveness of a claimant, the skill of a
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repealed. As currently constituted, NPDB reporting discourages settlements
of claims, impairs openness, prompts defensive medicine, and tempts
hospitals to help physicians evade reporting-all without providing useful
aggregate data that furthers performance improvement." 238
The Data Bank's problems are myriad. First, the malpractice reporting
requirement may actively thwart HCQIA's goal of promoting quality
improvement. It encourages physicians to prolong litigation and thereby
discourages the multi-faceted communication that is essential to understand
and remedy the root causes of adverse outcomes. Indeed, a lack of
communication is what prompts many patients to sue in the first place.
Moreover, physicians' NPDB-based reluctance to enter into early resolution
can impair hospitals' ability to create broad-based, problem-solving
settlements-an approach that has been shown to arrive at fairer results for
patients and families and to save considerable expense as well as redirect
litigation defense funds toward quality improvement efforts.
Second, the Data Bank's medical malpractice reports suffer from a host
of distortions and inaccuracies that render them, at best, difficult to interpret
and, at worst, effectively meaningless. Among those problems:
* Most filed claims are not related to negligent iatrogenesis, and most
negligent iatrogenesis does not result in a filed claim;
* The reporting requirement is essentially unenforceable-first,
because there is no way to ascertain whether or when a medical malpractice
payment has been made, other than to compare it with a completely
voluntary and therefore unreliable outside data base; and second, because
HRSA acknowledges that enforcement is prohibitively costly when
compared with the $11,000 penalty that would be garnered from finding and
fining a violator;
* Although some reports may reflect payments for malpractice
settlements or judgments, others reflect exclusively a business decision to
pay rather than fight, and there is no way to discern which are which;
claimant's attorney, the demands of a busy medical practice and the unpredictability
of juries can all lead health care practitioners to settle cases or lose verdicts with
respect to medical services that meet or exceed accepted standards of medical care.
Furthermore, even a legitimate malpractice claim does not automatically mean that a
practitioner deserves disciplinary action. Any practitioner-even the most skilled
and careful--can make an occasional mistake.
H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384 re. P.L. 99-660,
6396.
238 Sage, supra note 3, at 1307.
176
[Vol. 27:1 2012]
THE VIRTUES OF DODGING THE DATA BANK
* Although every medical malpractice payment must be reported for
ordinary physicians, government-employed physicians are reported under
completely different standards, and sovereign immunity and charitable
immunity introduce further imbalance.
Third, the very purpose of collecting medical malpractice data-to
inform hospital peer review committees in their credentialing and peer
review decisions-has become largely anachronistic if deemed an effective
way to spot and restrict incompetent physicians. Although peer review
remains an important, indeed essential, element of quality and safety
improvement, hospitals are no longer a key locus that can be counted on to
monitor virtually every physician. In current health care, broader consortia of
providers, such as integrated networks and ACOs, have significant and
growing financial incentives to ensure that their practitioners are providing
high-quality care. It is a re-direction of energy, away from emphasizing the
errors of individual practitioners, toward learning from errors in order to
improve care as a whole.
From these observations we conclude that the optimal course would
simply be to remove medical malpractice payments from the National
Practitioner Data Bank. They appear to do distinctly more harm than good.
This would take an act of Congress, however, which may or may not happen
in the near term. Shy of that, it is appropriate for practitioners and their
insurers to take advantage of every lawful opportunity to avoid reporting to
the Data Bank-that is, to welcome efforts by plaintiffs and attorneys to
work with hospitals and other institutions who can invoke the corporate
shield as part of a global resolution to a case, and to refrain from needlessly
reporting payments made during a pre-suit notification period. Plaintiff
attorneys should be encouraged to use oral communication whenever
possible, and when they must file a pre-suit notice, to do so using the
language of "potential" or "possible" claim, not simply of "claim."
With conscientious use of HCQIA's available flexibility, it is to be hoped
that physicians can participate far more actively, and with considerably
greater comfort than they do at present, in the kinds of early dispute
resolution that can promote fairer settlements for patients and families, save
on defense costs by avoiding needless litigation, and redirect efforts toward
systematic quality improvement. Dodging the Data Bank can indeed be
virtuous.
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